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RESTRUCTURING MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY
Laura Napoli Coordes*
Abstract
What sorts of legal relief should be available to a municipality in
financial distress? Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code has served as an
option of last resort for many municipalities over the years. But as this
Article illustrates, Chapter 9 arguably falls short of an effective solution
and at times seems to contravene the foundational principles underlying
bankruptcy law. By examining recent Chapter 9 filings, this Article
presents a comprehensive analysis of how and why Chapter 9 has failed
to address the problems that characterize municipal insolvencies. It
argues that Chapter 9, in both practice and principle, has proved
unsatisfactory in combating the very issues it was designed to resolve.
After highlighting Chapter 9’s shortcomings, this Article suggests critical
areas of reform that will begin to reconcile Chapter 9 with the broader
goals of bankruptcy law.
I. INTRODUCTION
In sunny California, a city is struggling. Crime is up, and infrastructure
improvements are down.1 In 2013, “there were more than two dozen homicides
compared to just seven in 2006.”2 “Residents are leaving.”3 City officials expect
pension payments to jump to over 20% of the city’s budget, putting the city into a
“death spiral.”4 Moody’s Investors Service has concluded that the city “remains
vulnerable to increasing annual [pension] payments.”5
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1
Irma Widjojo, Vallejo Homicide Numbers Highest in Nearly 20 Years, TIMESHERALD (Jan. 2, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.timesheraldonline.com/generalnews/20140102/vallejo-homicide-numbers-highest-in-nearly-20-years [http://perma.cc/Y4
RV-FQQN].
2
Bob Adelmann, Vallejo, California, Likely Headed for Second Bankruptcy, NEW AM.
(Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.thenewamerican.com/economy/sectors/item/17865-vallejocalifornia-likely-headed-for-second-bankruptcy [http://perma.cc/WHJ6-4XTB].
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Bankrupt California Cities Face Steep Climb to Solvency Without Pension Relief,
MOODY’S INV. SERV. (Feb. 20, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted),
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This city may seem like a prime candidate for municipal bankruptcy under
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. But in fact, this city has already filed for Chapter
9 and emerged from bankruptcy less than five years ago.6 This city is Vallejo,
California, and it faces a very real risk of tumbling back into the financial distress
Chapter 9 was supposed to help alleviate.7
Over the past few decades, counties, cities, and towns have turned to Chapter 9
to adjust their debts and to receive a fresh start that enables them to better address
other issues, such as rising crime or failed infrastructure projects.8 On paper, Chapter
9 provides distinct advantages to a struggling municipality, including breathing
room to assess its situation free from the pressures of creditors, the ability to
renegotiate contracts, and an opportunity to formulate a plan of adjustment to deal
with debts.9 In practice, however, entities utilizing Chapter 9 face expensive, timeconsuming, and resource-draining battles that often prevent them from achieving the
very outcomes they seek from bankruptcy.10
Overwhelming pension shortfalls, poorly structured financing deals, and the
aftermath of the economic recession are leading more municipalities to consider
bankruptcy as an option for dealing with financial distress.11 A close look at the
Chapter 9 cases filed over the last few years indicates, however, that Chapter 9 has
often been unable to help municipalities achieve the goals they seek from
bankruptcy, notably, elimination of holdout creditors and reduction of debt
overhang.12 By focusing on these recent municipal bankruptcy cases, this Article
draws attention to Chapter 9’s limitations and demonstrates that Chapter 9, as
currently used, often undermines the very objectives it is designed to help
municipalities accomplish.

https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Bankrupt-California-cities-face-steep-climbto-solvency-without--PR_293349 [https://perma.cc/Z67P-PMEW].
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 470 (1993) (noting that
“municipal bankruptcy is based on the idea of the fresh start”).
9
See JONES DAY, AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 9 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE:
MUNICIPAL DEBT ADJUSTMENTS 11 (2010), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/d5
18067b-5e02-47c5-9768-fc692bb8ccd8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/55c686be-d1
08-4786-aee6-de946542d3da/Chapter%209%20Municipal%20Debt.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CF9A-LTK2].
10
Id.
11
Id. at 3.
12
Although it is admittedly difficult to find consensus among scholars on the goals of
municipal bankruptcy, the literature in this area consistently speaks of bankruptcy as a
mechanism to eliminate holdout creditors and reduce debt overhang, the condition where an
entity’s debt is so significant that it cannot easily borrow money that would help it get out of
debt. This literature is described in greater detail in Parts III and IV, infra.
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This Article provides a thorough analysis of recent municipal bankruptcies to
assess exactly how and why Chapter 9 is failing our cities and towns.13 Chapter 9
was modeled off of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and this Article
demonstrates that Chapter 11’s tools are often an ill fit for the municipalities Chapter
9 is intended to help. In addition to describing Chapter 9’s practical shortcomings,
this Article shows that Chapter 9 commonly leads to results that are inconsistent
with a coherent vision of bankruptcy law.
Although the academic literature to date has acknowledged many of Chapter
9’s shortcomings,14 Chapter 9 is still considered by many to be an appropriate, if
tedious, method of addressing municipal financial distress.15 This Article bolsters
the arguments against that view16 by providing a critical analysis of Chapter 9’s
13

This Article’s focus is on cities, towns, counties, and other general-purpose entities,
as distinguished from special-purpose districts and school districts. Although the latter are
frequently considered to be municipalities that can file for Chapter 9, the unique struggles of
the general-purpose municipal bankruptcies that have been filed over the past few decades
are this Article’s primary focus. A full discussion of the differences between special- and
general-purpose bankruptcies is beyond this Article’s scope; however, Part IV, infra,
contains recommendations for tailoring Chapter 9 relief more closely so as to distinguish the
needs of general-purpose and special-purpose entities.
14
See, e.g., Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland/The Detroit Bankruptcy: Why Debts
Associated with Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never Die . . . and How They
Are Killing Cities like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 813 (2014) (“Even when
municipal bankruptcy (and debt adjustment) is available, it is not a ‘cure-all,’ especially for
taxpayers and public workers.”); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and
Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 287 (2012) (“The current
legal structure for addressing municipal fiscal distress may interfere with, rather than
advance, the objectives of fiscal federalism . . . .”); Katherine Newby Kishfy, Preserving
Local Autonomy in the Face of Municipal Financial Crisis: Reconciling Rhode Island’s
Response to the Central Falls Financial Crisis with the State’s Home Rule Tradition, 16
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 348, 358 (2011) (“Overall, then, Chapter 9 bankruptcy provides
an incomplete solution to the problem of municipal insolvency.”); McConnell & Picker,
supra note 8, at 479 (“It may well be . . . that federal municipal bankruptcy law is even more
fundamentally misconceived than at first appeared . . . .”).
15
See, e.g., Ryan Preston Dahl, Collective Bargaining Agreements and Chapter 9
Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 295, 298 (2007) (“The availability of bankruptcy-specific
rights is of heightened importance to the municipal debtor.”); Henry C. Kevane, Deploying
the “Prepackaged” Plan of Adjustments in Chapter 9, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY
STRATEGIES 107, 109 (Jo Alice Darden ed., 2011) (“Although Chapter 9 rightly remains an
option of last resort . . . it now seems more probable that municipalities will begin to use
federal bankruptcy relief as an active tool to re-calibrate revenues, services and expenses.”);
Richard W. Trotter, Running on Empty: Municipal Insolvency and Rejection of Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 45, 49 (2011) (noting
that Chapter 9 bankruptcy is becoming an “increasingly viable” and sometimes “attractive”
option).
16
See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 14, at 283; Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 382 (2010); McConnell
& Picker, supra note 8, 482–83.
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modern usage that specifically identifies how and why Chapter 9 harms the specific
entities it is intended to help.
Unlike those who believe that Chapter 9 should be discarded, however, this
Article posits that reform can make Chapter 9 a more effective solution to certain
municipal problems. Thus, after explaining why Chapter 9 is not working as
designed, this Article targets several areas for reform. By analyzing Chapter 9
against the broader backdrop of bankruptcy law, this Article illustrates the need to
develop a Chapter 9-specific toolkit in order to give municipalities the relief they
seek. Still, this Article cautions that a one-size-fits-all solution may be impractical
for addressing the various problems encountered by the wide variety of distressed
municipalities that rely upon Chapter 9 for relief. Indeed, Chapter 9 is ineffective in
part because it does not account for most of these variations in problems and entity
types. Only by acknowledging and understanding the primary shortcomings of
Chapter 9 can policymakers move forward with clarifying the roles of various actors
to resolve municipal distress and develop more appropriate avenues of relief. Thus,
this Article begins to illuminate key areas of reform that will make Chapter 9 more
effective at resolving the problems it is supposed to address.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides the necessary background
on Chapter 9’s development and highlights several flaws present in its design. Part
III then examines one of Chapter 9’s most controversial elements: stringent
eligibility requirements that force debtors to expend significant time and resources
just to prove that they belong in bankruptcy. Part IV uses a series of cases to illustrate
exactly how and why Chapter 9 fails to work. On a structural level, Chapter 9 does
not provide municipalities with the tools necessary to adjust their debts in any
meaningful manner, thus rooting them more deeply into their financial problems.
More broadly, Chapter 9 interferes with the goals underlying the bankruptcy system.
Using these insights, Part V suggests and evaluates possible alternative avenues for
relief, concluding that a rigid solution for tackling the problem of municipal financial
distress likely does not exist. Instead, any solution to the municipal distress problem
must be flexible enough to account for the various alternative mechanisms states
already have in place, in addition to states’ and cities’ varying political, fiscal, and
social climates. This Article concludes by encouraging more research into Chapter
9 reform while emphasizing that suggestions to bolster Chapter 9’s effectiveness or
supplementation of Chapter 9 with state and regional relief must begin by realigning
Chapter 9 practice with basic bankruptcy theory.
II. CHAPTER 9’S DEVELOPMENT AND DESIGN
A careful examination of Chapter 9’s development reveals that it is a body of
reactionary law, designed to patch up impending crises, but ill-equipped to function
as a broader solution to a complex and fluid set of problems. This poor fit creates
unpredictability and instability in the law. To illustrate this concept, Part II focuses
on one of Chapter 9’s most unique structural elements: the existence of stringent
eligibility requirements that force debtors already at death’s door to expend
substantial time and resources justifying their use of Chapter 9. Specifically, section

2016]

RESTRUCTURING MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY

311

II.A traces Chapter 9’s development and design, and section II.B analyzes some of
the difficulties that result from the need for municipalities to comply with Chapter
9’s eligibility requirements.
A. Development
Chapter 9 began as a response to the Great Depression, a time when thousands
of municipalities defaulted.17 In 1933, Congress amended what was then the
Bankruptcy Act to enable cities and towns to adjust debts that were becoming
overwhelming.18 Although these entities could theoretically have adjusted their
debts without federal assistance,19 they typically faced a holdout creditor, an entity
that refused to agree to the adjustment, even though most others were on board. By
allowing a bankruptcy judge to approve debt adjustments agreed upon by a
supermajority of creditors (rather than a unanimous vote), Congress alleviated the
holdout creditor problem.20
Bankruptcy law is uniquely used to overcome holdout creditor problems
because contracts cannot be modified on a nonconsensual basis under state law.21
Instead, only federal law gives entities the power to modify or terminate contracts
over objections.22 Bankruptcy law also counters the collective action problem that
results when creditors pursue their individual interests with respect to a distressed
debtor by providing for a single, collective process for debt resolution.23 Thus, it was
reasonable for Congress to seek bankruptcy remedies for holdout creditors and
collective action problems plaguing municipalities.

17
Daniel J. Freyberg, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State Authorization to Be a
Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal Insolvency—and What Will States
Do Now?, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1997); Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards:
The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888, 923 (2012) (“Chapter 9 municipal
bankruptcy in the United States came about partly in response to creditor holdout behavior
that blocked municipal debt adjustment, as well as a spate of lawsuits against municipal
officials during the Great Depression.”).
18
Vincent S.J. Buccola, Who Does Bankruptcy? Mapping Pension Impairment in
Chapter 9, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 585, 592 (2014).
19
Indeed, prior to 1934, municipalities did not have federal assistance with debt
adjustment. KENNETH N. KLEE, A SHORT HISTORY OF MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY 1 (2012),
https://cumberland.samford.edu/files/Short%20History%20of%20Municipal%20Bankruptc
y.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP6A-7BEE]. This meant that creditors had only state law rights
(such as filing a mandamus action), and that municipal debt adjustment was limited by the
Contracts Clause of the Constitution. Id.
20
Buccola, supra note 18, at 592–93.
21
See McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 450.
22
See id. (noting that state law was insufficient to remedy the holdout creditor problem).
23
See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1190
(2014); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 682 (2012)
(“[M]ost American bankruptcy scholars have understood bankruptcy as a response to
collective action problems . . . .”).

312

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

The Supreme Court, however, was not convinced, and in 1936, the Court
declared Congress’s amendments an unconstitutional encroachment on state
sovereignty.24 In Ashton v. Cameron County Water District,25 the Court expressed
concern that the national government, through the Bankruptcy Act, was
inappropriately interfering with the obligations of state political subdivisions, in
contravention of the Tenth Amendment, which reserves undelegated powers to the
states.26 Specifically, the Court held the federal government could not use the
Constitution’s bankruptcy clause to impair state powers or to pass any laws
inconsistent with the idea of state sovereignty.27 The Court noted that the federal
government was improperly intruding into the state’s internal, commercial affairs
by interfering with municipalities’ contractual obligations.28 In short, by allowing
municipalities to take advantage of federal laws to adjust their debts and contracts,
the amendments, according to the Court, impermissibly invited intrusion of the
federal government and federal laws into state financial affairs.
The Court’s ruling in Ashton proved only a minor setback. In 1937, Congress
revisited the Bankruptcy Act and enacted amendments very similar to those the
Court had struck down.29 This time, however, the Supreme Court upheld the
amendments.30 The Court’s somewhat puzzling change of heart may perhaps be
explained by changes in economic climate31 or in the composition of the Court,32 but
the revised amendments also provided more limited powers for the bankruptcy court
in municipal cases, potentially alleviating the Court’s concern about federal
government intrusion into state affairs.33 Despite its earlier reservations, in United
States v. Bekins,34 the Court upheld these new amendments and seemed to accept the
24

Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 527

(1936).
25

298 U.S. 513 (1936).
Id. at 531.
27
See id. at 530–31. Specifically, the Court expressed concerns that allowing
municipalities to declare bankruptcy would permit the federal government to interfere with
states’ and municipalities’ contractual obligations, thus prohibiting them from managing
their own affairs. Id.
28
Id. at 528; see Eric W. Lam, Municipal Bankruptcy: The Problem with Chapter 9
Eligibility—A Proposal to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2)(1988), 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 628
(1990).
29
Lam, supra note 28, at 628.
30
United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938).
31
See Lam, supra note 28, at 629 (noting that the Court “referr[ed] to the ‘steadily
deteriorating economy of the early 1930s’” in its decision (citation omitted)).
32
See Freyberg, supra note 17, at 1003 n.22 (describing the justices who made up the
Court in both Ashton, 298 U.S. 513 (1936), and Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938)).
33
Jonathan J. Spitz, Federalism, States, and the Power to Regulate Municipal
Bankruptcies: Who May Be a Debtor Under Section 109(c)?, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 621, 623
(1993) (stating that “Congress was cognizant . . . of the potential constitutional problems that
existed in the exercise of federal court jurisdiction over an agency or instrumentality of a
state and was careful to avoid interfering with the powers reserved to the states . . . .”).
34
304 U.S. 27 (1938).
26
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idea that the federal bankruptcy system could provide valuable relief for distressed
municipalities.35 By limiting the powers of the bankruptcy court, Congress
successfully struck a balance between allowing federal relief and protecting state
sovereignty.
Although Congress initially intended these amendments, referred to as Chapter
IX of the Bankruptcy Act,36 to be a temporary measure to cabin the harms of the
Great Depression, in 1946, Congress permanently incorporated the amendments into
the Bankruptcy Act.37 In the 1970s, Congress revised the Bankruptcy Act and sought
to make it easier for larger cities to file for bankruptcy relief.38 New York City was
facing serious financial difficulties during this time, and Congress wanted New York
and other large cities to be able to utilize Chapter IX.39 Thus, Congress expanded
the types of debt that could be adjusted and expanded the scope of the municipality’s
powers in bankruptcy to respond to New York’s financial crisis.40 Despite these
revisions, New York City received a bailout and did not utilize Chapter IX.41
The next major set of municipal bankruptcy revisions came in the 1980s, after
the Bankruptcy Code had replaced the Bankruptcy Act, and Chapter IX became
Chapter 9. During this time, Congress again grew concerned that a financially
distressed city, this time Cleveland, could not utilize Chapter 9 effectively.42 Thus,
Congress made adjustments to portions of other Bankruptcy Code chapters that had
been incorporated into Chapter 9.43 Specifically, Congress added provisions to
Chapter 9 that gave different treatment to special revenue debt, after concerns arose
that this debt could be converted into full recourse unsecured debt during
bankruptcy, creating problems for municipalities like Cleveland that were restricted

35
M. Heith Frost, States As Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific
Authorization, and Protection of Municipal Economic Health, 84 MISS. L.J. 817, 829 (2015).
36
At that time, Chapter 9 was called Chapter IX under the Bankruptcy Act’s numbering
system.
37
See In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 778 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (“In
1946, Congress made the municipal bankruptcy provisions permanent . . . .”).
38
Id. at 780 (describing the specific revisions).
39
Spitz, supra note 33, at 624–25. Specifically, the requirement that 51% (in amount)
of creditors accept a plan before the bankruptcy petition was filed was impossible for cities
with large numbers of creditors. Id. at 624.
40
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
16th ed. 2015).
41
KLEE, supra note 19, at 6–7 (noting that the crisis in New York prompted revisions
to the Bankruptcy Act and that bankruptcy for New York was averted); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
When Should Bankruptcy Be an Option (for People, Places, or Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2217, 2241 (2014) (noting that, in New York City, “a bailout avoided the contagion
effects that bankruptcy might have unleashed”).
42
Mary Williams Walsh, In Alabama, a County That Fell Off the Financial Cliff, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2012) (on file with the Utah Law Review), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
02/19/business/jefferson-county-ala-falls-off-the-bankruptcy-cliff.html?_r=1.
43
KLEE, supra note 19, at 8.
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from incurring recourse debt beyond a given threshold.44 These adjustments were
incorporated into the 1988 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, yet Cleveland
ultimately also avoided a bankruptcy filing.45
In the 1990s, yet another city crisis provided the impetus for further
amendments to Chapter 9. Unlike New York City and Cleveland, the city of
Bridgeport, Connecticut, actually filed for bankruptcy. Yet, the State of Connecticut
quickly challenged Bridgeport’s authority to file for federal relief.46 This highly
publicized dispute motivated Congress to clarify the state authorization eligibility
requirement in 1994.47 To do this, Congress replaced the requirement that
municipalities receive “general authorization to file” with the more stringent
requirement of specific state authorization.48
Under the old general authorization requirement, silence in the law created
implicit assent to filing, but now, if no state law specifically authorizes
municipalities to file, a municipality wishing to utilize Chapter 9 must seek authority
from the state legislature to do so.49 This process was designed in part to strike a
better balance between federal and state authority, allowing states to have a more
direct and specific say about when federal bankruptcy laws could be utilized to help
struggling municipalities.50
Congress’s enactment of the specific authorization requirements in response to
the Bridgeport bankruptcy further illustrates one of Chapter 9’s key characteristics:
its enactment and major revisions were all largely in response to crises. The
measures Congress took in each version of Chapter 9 were crisis-driven, aimed at
resolving a specific and pressing problem.51 Yet, the large cities that drove most of
the major changes to Chapter 9 ultimately never used it, leaving the “improvements”

44
Id. Specifically, lenders who lent money backed by “special revenues” could
conceivably convert their debt into full recourse unsecured debt in bankruptcy, which could
create problems for municipalities like Cleveland. Id.
45
Id.
46
JAMES E. SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, PRIMER ON MUNICIPAL DEBT
ADJUSTMENT: CHAPTER 9: THE LAST RESORT FOR FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED
MUNICIPALITIES 10
(2012),
http://www.afgi.org/resources/Bankruptcy_Primer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NV76-TMX2].
47
Frost, supra note 35, at 832.
48
SPIOTTO, supra note 46, at 10.
49
See George B. South III & Daniel G. Egan, City of Harrisburg Chapter 9 Bankruptcy
Dismissed, DLA PIPER (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications
/2012/03/city-of-harrisburg-chapter-9-bankruptcy-dismissed/
[https://perma.cc/W2PAGSNT].
50
H. SLAYTON DABNEY, JR. ET AL., MUNICIPALITIES IN PERIL: THE ABI GUIDE TO
CHAPTER 9, at 11–13 (2d ed. 2012).
51
See Adam Feibelman, American States and Sovereign Debt Restructuring, in WHEN
STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN
FISCAL CRISIS 146, 186 (Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel eds., 2012) (noting that if a crisis
point is reached, “the question of amending Chapter 9 will be wrapped up in debates about
how to resolve that crisis”).
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Congress made untested. Compounding this issue is Chapter 9’s lack of originality.52
Chapter 9 borrows most of its provisions from other chapters of the Bankruptcy
Code.53 Its most prominent contributor is Chapter 11, which is designed primarily to
deal with the restructuring of business entities.54 As explored in more detail below,
the organization, funding structures, and practical problems of a municipality are
vastly different from those facing a corporate entity.55 This makes it difficult for
Chapter 11 rules to address municipal distress.56
A further difficulty is that Chapter 9 applies one set of rules to a variety of
entities that are vastly different in structure and function. Although this Article
focuses on cities, towns, and counties, a municipality could be a hospital, a water
authority, or a sewer district, to name only a few additional possibilities. Thus, one
municipal entity type may look vastly different from another in terms of funding,
structure, and operations.57 Adding a further level of complexity are the many
disparate types of municipal securities.58 Finally, the underlying causes of municipal
financial crises are enormously varied.59 Thus, even though hundreds of debtors
have utilized Chapter 9, the variation in entity type, funding structure, and root
causes of crises makes much of the case law difficult to apply as precedent.60
52
See generally DABNEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 41–56 (noting that several sections
of Chapter 9 were borrowed from other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
See, e.g., Kimhi, supra note 16, at 369–72 (discussing bankruptcy for municipalities);
see also Lotta Moberg & Richard E. Wagner, Default Without Capital Account: The
Economics of Municipal Bankruptcy 14 PUB. FIN. & MGMT. 30, 31 (2014) (“With
commercial corporations, there typically exists an active market for shares of ownership and
there is at any moment a market value for the corporation. In contrast, there is no direct
market for ownership shares of municipalities, so no market value can be established for
them.”); Skeel, supra note 41, at 2227–28 (suggesting that municipal bankruptcy is more
closely akin to bankruptcy for individuals than corporations).
56
See Andrew L. Turscak, Jr. et al., Settling the Municipal Landscape: How Pre-Plan
Settlements in Chapter 9 May Sidestep the Traditional Claims-Resolution Process, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., May 2013, at 44, 44 (“[T]he extent to which the Code does and does not
apply in [C]hapter 9 has been likened to a ‘patchwork’ or a ‘puzzle.’” (quoting In re City of
Stockton, 486 B.R. 194, 198 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013)).
57
See Skeel, supra note 41, at 2220–21 (contrasting special-purpose entities with major
cities); see also McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 453 (describing how Congress initially
believed that counties were “on a different constitutional footing” than municipalities and
therefore excluded from Chapter 9).
58
Christine Sgarlata Chung, Government Budgets as the Hunger Games: The Brutal
Competition for State and Local Government Resources Given Municipal Securities Debt,
Pension and OBEP Obligations, and Taxpayer Needs, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 663, 688–
89 (2014).
59
See Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88
B.U. L. REV. 633, 638 (2008) (noting that scholars disagree over the nature and importance
of factors driving a city’s economic health or decline).
60
This variation also makes it challenging for Congress to determine how best to amend
Chapter 9. See generally Nicholas B. Malito, Municipal Bankruptcy: An Overview of
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Chapter 9’s development as a series of reactionary laws, combined with its
broad application to a wide variety of entities, has led to an unpredictable legal
system. This unpredictability erodes confidence in the bankruptcy laws.61
B. Eligibility Battles
This section explores how the balance Congress struck to preserve state
sovereignty and allow for federal assistance plays out in one unique aspect of
Chapter 9: the eligibility battles that municipalities must engage in to gain access to
federal bankruptcy relief. Due in part to Chapter 9’s unpredictability, filing for
municipal bankruptcy is seen as a last resort.62 This typically means that any
municipality seeking Chapter 9 relief is in truly desperate straits. Nevertheless, in
many cases, when a municipality files a Chapter 9 case, it must embark on an
arduous journey to prove that it is indeed eligible for bankruptcy relief. This process
can take anywhere from a few months to several years. The eligibility battles
chronicled below provide a striking illustration of Chapter 9 creditors’ ability to
impede access to relief and the costs involved in striking a balance between the
protection of state sovereignty and the use of federal bankruptcy power.63 First,
however, some background information on the eligibility requirements is necessary.
Accordingly, the below discussion explores: (1) the eligibility requirements, (2) the
extensive eligibility fights, and (3) the harm that results.
1. Eligibility Requirements
Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code lists the requirements for a debtor to be
eligible for Chapter 9 relief. The municipal debtor must prove that it meets each
requirement by a preponderance of the evidence.64 In addition, § 921(c) provides
Chapter 9 and a Critique of the “Specifically Authorized” and “Insolvent” Eligibility
Requirements of 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(c), 17 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 517 (2008)
(discussing the history of municipal bankruptcy, the purpose of Chapter 9, and the lack of
case law for Congress to review).
61
See Simon Johnson, The Myth of a Perfect Orderly Liquidation Authority for Big
Banks, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (May 16, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.
com/2013/05/16/the-myth-of-a-perfect-orderly-liquidation-authority-for-big-banks/?_php=
true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1 [http://perma.cc/H8X7-L924] (“Once
you establish special treatment and break with precedents, the entire legal process becomes
murky, unpredictable and likely to spread more fear than confidence in the outcomes.”). The
article was referring to proposed Chapter 14 special rules for banks, but the same statement
would apply equally well to Chapter 9. Id.
62
See, e.g., Kevane, supra note 15, at 109 (noting that “Chapter 9 rightly remains an
option of last resort”); In re Pierce Cty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 714 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
2009) (“The legislative history indicates that the strict hurdles to filing Chapter 9 were
implemented to ensure that it was considered by a municipality only as a last resort.”).
63
See infra subsection II.B.2.
64
Melissa B. Jacoby, The Detroit Bankruptcy, Pre-Eligibility, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
849, 851 (2014).
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that the bankruptcy judge may dismiss the debtor’s petition if the municipality did
not file the petition in good faith.65
(a) The entity must be a “municipality” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code
“Municipality” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a “political subdivision or
public agency or instrumentality of a State.”66 Cities, towns, and counties easily fit
this definition.67 Other semigovernmental entities, such as a water authority or an
irrigation district, however, may not.68 These entities must look to bankruptcy case
law to determine whether they fit within the definition.69
(b) The entity must be authorized to be a debtor under Chapter 9 by state law
As discussed above, to better protect state control over federal intrusion into
state commercial affairs, Congress has provided for specific state authorization.70 In
practice, this means that a state law must exist or be sought specifically granting the
municipality, “in its capacity as a municipality or by name,” the ability to file for
Chapter 9.71
The specific authorization requirement gives states great leeway as to which, if
any, of their municipal entities may seek federal bankruptcy relief. Although twentyseven states allow their municipalities to file for federal bankruptcy, most of these
states set additional requirements or processes for approval as well.72 Many states
use some form of “gatekeeper” from whom the municipality must receive approval
before filing.73 Often, this gatekeeper is a politician or political body. For example,
municipalities in Connecticut must obtain the prior written consent of the governor
before filing.74 Thus, even a state that nominally allows its municipalities to file for
bankruptcy may impose additional requirements, some of which may make the path
to bankruptcy as much of a political exercise as it is a financial one. The specific
state authorization requirement effectively creates dual eligibility processes—one at
65

11 U.S.C. § 921(c) (2012).
Id. § 101(40).
67
Francisco Vazquez, Examining Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy Cases, in CHAPTER
9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES 173, 183 (Jo Alice Darden ed., 2011) (“A political subdivision
generally includes a county, parish, city, town, village, borough, or township.”).
68
See, e.g., In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 265–67 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that legislative history is not helpful in determining the scope of a
“political subdivision, public agency, or instrumentality of a State”).
69
Patrick Darby et al., Corporate Bankruptcy Panel: Municipal Restructuring, 29
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 333, 335–37 (2013).
70
See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
71
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2).
72
Anderson, supra note 23, at 1152.
73
Henry C. Kevane, Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy: The New “New Thing”? Part I,
BUS. L. TODAY, May 2011, at 1, 2.
74
DABNEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 31–35.
66
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the federal level, and one at the state level—making relief complicated for struggling
municipalities.
Other states have no authorizing statute.75 Although a few of these states
affirmatively ban municipalities from filing for bankruptcy, in most states, there is
simply nothing on the books to indicate whether filing for bankruptcy is acceptable
or not. In these states, municipalities may file for bankruptcy only if they seek
explicit permission or changes to state legislation, a process that can be timeconsuming and expensive, not to mention fraught with political tension.76 In practice
then, the specific authorization requirement has made it very difficult for
municipalities to obtain Chapter 9 relief.
(c) The entity must be insolvent
Insolvency under the Bankruptcy Code is defined to mean that the municipality
is “generally not paying its debts as they become due” or is “unable to pay its debts
as they become due.”77 In recent years, courts have been receptive to new and
creative illustrations of insolvency.78 For example, a court may analyze the
municipality’s cash flow, budgets, and balance sheets, or its service-delivery
abilities, to determine whether the municipality is insolvent.79 Municipalities are not
required to have raised taxes to the legal limit to be considered insolvent.80 To prove
insolvency, however, municipalities must often produce “substantial financial and
accounting evidence.”81
(d) The entity must be willing to adjust its debts by implementing a plan
This requirement is usually interpreted to mean that the municipality must show
that it is filing for bankruptcy in order to develop a plan of adjustment, rather than

75

Kevane, supra note 73, at 2.
Paul R. Glassman, A Practical Guide to Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy, in
CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES 203, 210 (Jo Alice Darden ed., 2011); see also Bill
Rochelle & Sherri Toub, Suffolk Off-Track Betting Confirms Plan in Second Chapter 9 After
Three Years, 26 BANKR. L. REP. (BNA) 1521, 1536 (2014) (noting that Suffolk Off-Track
Betting’s first bankruptcy was dismissed after the judge determined that the county
legislature was not authorized under state law to give the municipality permission to file and
that a year later, the state legislature passed a bill authorizing the municipality to file for
bankruptcy).
77
11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C)(i)–(ii) (2012).
78
Lynn M. Brimer et al., Measuring Service-Delivery Insolvency in Chapter 9, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2014, at 26, 27 (citing the Stockton bankruptcy, where the court
examined “service-delivery insolvency”).
79
Id. at 26.
80
Freyberg, supra note 17, at 1005.
81
Glassman, supra note 76, at 211.
76
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to buy time or avoid creditors.82 Therefore, courts will look for the municipality to
have developed some sort of plan or outline of a plan when it decides to file.83
(e) The entity must demonstrate some sort of relationship with creditors
The final eligibility prong requires demonstration of one of four possibilities
with respect to this relationship.84 The municipal entity must show it:
(A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in
amount of the claims of each class that . . . [will be] impair[ed] under a
plan . . . ;
(B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors, and has failed to obtain the
[necessary] agreement . . . ;
(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is
impracticable; or
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that
is avoidable [as a preference].85
The second and third possibilities are frequently the subject of eligibility
battles. Notably, the second possibility only requires the debtor to negotiate in good
faith; in other words, no reciprocal good-faith requirement exists for creditors.86
What it means to negotiate in “good faith” is unsettled under the law, meaning that
debtors may manipulate the facts in order to demonstrate that good-faith
negotiations have occurred.87 The third possibility, often used by larger cities and
towns, requires the debtor to negotiate with large groups of creditors.88 Detroit is the
82
Eric S. Pommer & Marc M. Friedman, Municipal Bankruptcy and Its Effect on
Government Contractors, 25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 249, 254 (1996).
83
In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280, 297 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009) (noting that the goodfaith negotiation requirement means that “some outline or term sheet of a plan which
designates classes of creditors and their treatment is necessary”). Although the extent to
which a municipality must have already developed a plan varies depending on the case,
requiring a municipality to have some sort of plan at all is somewhat of a puzzle, given that
one of Chapter 9’s arguable advantages is the breathing space it provides for municipalities
to assess their situation and develop a workable plan. Interpreting this requirement to mean
that municipalities must have a plan or solid plan idea in place at the outset could diminish
the value of this breathing space. See John J. Rapisardi et al., Chapter 9: A Big Stick, Rarely
Used, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES 153, 157 (Jo Alice Darden ed., 2011) (noting
that the Bankruptcy Code requires a municipal debtor to file its plan with its bankruptcy
petition, but that the court may also set a later date).
84
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(A)–(D) (2012).
85
Id.
86
See Darby et al., supra note 69, at 343.
87
See In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 274, 278–79 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that courts disagree over what is required to show that good-faith
negotiations have occurred but agree that “no formal complete plan” is necessary).
88
In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 176–79 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
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most recent and notable municipal entity to have utilized this possibility to meet this
eligibility requirement.89
The manipulability of the “good faith” and “impracticability” measures has
come to Congress’s attention. In 2014, Representative John Conyers introduced
legislation to amend §109 to require a municipality to negotiate with creditors before
seeking Chapter 9 protection unless such negotiations would be “impossible” rather
than impracticable.90 The bill also proposed changing the definition of “good
faith.”91
2. Extensive Eligibility Fights
Litigation over whether a municipal debtor has met all of the requirements for
Chapter 9 eligibility is common in the bankruptcy cases of towns and cities. This is
in part because of the structure of the eligibility requirements. Since a debtor must
usually negotiate with creditors prior to filing a case, if a Chapter 9 case is in fact
filed, creditors opposed to the debtor’s position are already lined up and ready to
fight before the case gets off the ground.92 This is in stark contrast to a Chapter 11
case, where there are virtually no eligibility requirements and where the bankruptcy
filing may even come as a surprise to some creditors.93
Chapter 9 eligibility battles are difficult for several reasons. As previously
mentioned, many of the requirements, such as the necessity of negotiating with
creditors in “good faith,” have devolved into opaque and confusing standards, as
judges attempt to apply the requirements to a variety of municipal entities, each
charged with negotiating with vastly different groups of creditors.94

89
Joseph Lichterman & Bernie Woodall, In Largest-Ever U.S. City Bankruptcy, Cuts
Coming for Detroit Creditors, Retirees, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2013, 5:59 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-judge-idUSBRE9B20PZ2013
1203 [https://perma.cc/3UQV-R49G].
90
Stephanie M. Acree, Conyers Introduces Bills Protecting Workers in Ch. 9 Cases;
Preventing Utility Termination, 26 BANKR. L. REP. (BNA) 985, 989 (2014).
91
Id. Specifically, the bill would require the phrase “good faith” to be interpreted
according to the National Labor Relations Act, a stricter standard. Kyle Glazier, Bill Would
Make Chapter 9 Tough to Pursue, BOND BUYER (Jan. 8, 2015, 1:41 PM) (on file with the
Utah Law Review), http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/washington-budget-finance/billwould-make-chapter-9-tough-to-pursue-1069372-1.html. Since being introduced in the
House of Representatives in July 2014, the bill has received little attention. See id.
92
Glassman, supra note 76, at 208–09; see also Jacoby, supra note 64, at 855 (noting
that the early days of Detroit’s bankruptcy were characterized by multiple objections from
creditors).
93
See Bret A. Maidman, Chapter 13 v. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy for Small Business
Owners,
NOLO,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/chapter-13-chapter-11bankruptcy-small-business-owners.html [http://perma.cc/52DT-LNEW] (last visited Dec. 2,
2015) (“[A]lmost anyone can file bankruptcy under Chapter 11. . . . There are no debt or
income requirements or limitations for filing . . . .”).
94
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.

2016]

RESTRUCTURING MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY

321

The position of the court and creditors in a Chapter 9 case provides further
insight into why eligibility is such a contentious issue. Once again responding to
concerns that Chapter 9 interferes with states’ ability to govern their internal
commercial affairs, Congress gave the bankruptcy judge a very minor role to play
in Chapter 9 cases.95 For example, under Chapter 9, bankruptcy courts are prohibited
from interfering with a municipality’s property and revenue absent the
municipality’s consent, meaning that a municipality may spend its money in any
way that it likes without court oversight.96 Practically speaking then, eligibility
hearings are one of the few times in a Chapter 9 case where the judge, and the
creditors, can have a say in how the case proceeds.97 In contrast to Chapter 11, where
creditors typically can and do exercise their right to participate in numerous
hearings, in Chapter 9, there are generally few bankruptcy court hearings.98
Furthermore, unlike in Chapter 11, Chapter 9 does not permit creditors to file a
competing plan of adjustment. Instead, the municipality is the only entity that can
present a plan of adjustment for its debts, and creditors must simply vote for or
against that plan.99 Finally, creditors are limited in both the information they can
access100 and the type of relief they can request from the bankruptcy court. For
example, creditors may not convert the case to another bankruptcy chapter, nor, in
general, may they appoint a trustee or examiner to oversee the municipality’s
operations and affairs.101 Creditors struggle with these limitations and often feel as
though they cannot maximize their recoveries under Chapter 9.102 Thus, creditors
95

Specifically, Sections 903 and 904 of the Bankruptcy Code actively constrain the
bankruptcy courts. See 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (confirming that the state controls the
municipality); Id. § 904 (preventing courts from interfering with the debtor’s political
powers, property, revenues, and uses of certain property).
96
Turscak et al., supra note 56, at 56.
97
Stanley H. McGuffin, Chapter 9 As a Remedy for Financially Stressed
Municipalities, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES 70–76 (Jo Alice Darden ed., 2011).
98
Id. at 72–74.
99
Id. at 76.
100
Kenneth R. Epstein & Nelly Almeida, The Need for Greater Transparency in
Municipal Bankruptcies, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (Dec. 18, 2014), http://business-financerestructuring.weil.com/chapter-9/the-need-for-greater-transparency-in-municipal-bank
ruptcies/ [http://perma.cc/QRB6-QYP9] (arguing that a lack of mandatory disclosure
requirements for Chapter 9 debtors has resulted “in burdensome discovery . . . which
increases creditor and debtor litigation costs and diminishes the pool of assets available to
pay claims”).
101
McGuffin, supra note 97, at 76.
102
Lance Duroni, Unhappy Creditors Open Assault on Detroit Ch. 9 Plan, LAW 360
(Sept. 3, 2014, 7:33 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/573429/unhappy-creditors-openassault-on-detroit-ch-9-plan [https://perma.cc/23XL-EAZR] (describing the concerns
Detroit’s bond insurers expressed over the city’s decision to pay its retirees more than its
financial creditors); see also Karol K. Denniston, Neutral Evaluation in Chapter 9
Bankruptcies: Mitigating Municipal Distress, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 261, 263 (2012) (“The
administrative costs and the length of a Chapter 9 proceeding have the potential to seriously
impair what is likely to be an already impaired group of creditors.”).
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will fight a municipality’s entry into bankruptcy court tooth and nail.103 The
truncated powers of creditors, sometimes touted as one of Chapter 9’s chief
benefits,104 help explain why creditors may seize on the eligibility hearing as a
chance to assert what little influence they have in a Chapter 9 case.105
Once a municipal debtor passes through the eligibility gate, courts have held
that federal bankruptcy law (not state law) governs the issues that arise within the
case. Thus, the generally accepted rule is that states that authorize municipalities to
use Chapter 9 must accept Chapter 9 in its totality.106 For this reason, even a state
with a statute that authorizes Chapter 9 relief will sometimes object to a
municipality’s eligibility to file over concerns that federal bankruptcy law will
interfere with the state’s wishes for the municipality. For example, Pennsylvania
initially authorized Chapter 9 relief for cities like Harrisburg, but when Harrisburg
actually sought to file for bankruptcy, the state passed a new law blocking access to
federal relief and objected strenuously to Harrisburg’s attempts to file for Chapter
9.107
Although the stakes are high in an eligibility battle, denial of eligibility for
bankruptcy protection does not necessarily spell the end of a municipality’s
existence. In some instances, the judge might dismiss the case because the debtor
has regained its financial footing, in which case the municipality may be able to
continue to function on its own.108 In other cases, however, the municipality is left
to its own devices. For example, after its second petition for bankruptcy relief was
denied, the village of Washington Park, Illinois continued to struggle with its debts
and eventually was forced to consider disbanding its police force, a move that,
though likely financially necessary, was hardly wise in light of the village’s other

103

Denniston, supra note 102, at 268 (“Whether a municipality has negotiated in good
faith with its creditors before filing a petition is almost always litigated in a Chapter 9 case.”).
104
Lauren M. Wolfe, The Next Financial Hurricane? Rethinking Municipal Bankruptcy
in Louisiana, 72 LA. L. REV. 555, 566 (2012) (describing “cram down” and creditors’ weaker
bargaining position as benefits of Chapter 9).
105
See In re City of Desert Hot Springs, 327 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Congress,
in an effort to avoid possible constitutional problems, designed [C]hapter 9 of the bankruptcy
code in a manner much different from the other chapters. Many of the protections afforded
to creditors in the other chapters are missing in [C]hapter 9.”).
106
Trotter, supra note 15, at 76.
107
See South & Egan, supra note 49.
108
See, e.g., RICHARD LEVIN ET AL., CRAVATH, SWAINE, & MOORE LLP, SOME CAUSES
OF
MUNICIPAL
DISTRESS
AND
BANKRUPTCY
(2011),
https://www.nabl.org/portals/0/documents/panel_21_-_levin_material.pdf [https://perma.cc
/JDR7-UKMJ] (noting that the Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing by the City of Gould, Arkansas
was dismissed after the municipality regained financial stability); Rick Benedict, Illinois
Village Seeks Bankruptcy Protection, DAILYREPORTER.COM (Aug. 4, 2009, 12:41 PM),
http://dailyreporter.com/2009/08/04/illinois-village-seeks-bankruptcy-protection/
[http://perma.cc/2K29-773F] (describing Washington Park’s first bankruptcy, which “was
dismissed because the village [briefly] emerged from insolvency”).
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troubles, including the murder of its mayor.109 In other cases, municipalities that are
denied federal relief may seek out remedies under state law. For example, after being
denied bankruptcy relief, Harrisburg entered Pennsylvania’s state insolvency
system.110 In other scenarios, the municipality’s creditors may seek a writ of
mandamus in state court to compel the municipality to raise taxes.111 Nevertheless,
the potential loss of essential services after being denied Chapter 9 eligibility means
that municipalities that have decided to file will often fight strenuously to have their
case deemed eligible for bankruptcy relief. Unfortunately, the drain on time,
resources, and money to fight this eligibility battle is substantial.
3. The Harms of Eligibility Battles
An eligibility fight can easily take on a life of its own in a municipal bankruptcy
case. This is true even where it is ultimately determined that the municipality is
ineligible for relief. For example, at the time of Washington Park’s bankruptcy,
Illinois had not enabled the municipality to declare bankruptcy.112 In fact, legal
precedent existed showing that municipalities such as Washington Park were not
unconditionally authorized to file for Chapter 9 in Illinois.113 Nevertheless, it took
over a year for the bankruptcy judge to throw out Washington Park’s case, leaving
the town in limbo during that time.114
It is often difficult for the municipality to amass the evidence necessary to prove
that it meets the eligibility requirements. This is particularly true in the case of
insolvency. Some cities and towns may seek Chapter 9 relief only after a new
administration enters office and learns that the previous administration has created
a financial disaster. The new administration is forced to rely on scant or inaccurate
record-keeping by the previous administration in order to make its case for
109

Tim Jones, Illinois Stripper Haven Shows States Miss Bankruptcy Mess,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 23, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0724/illinois-stripper-haven-shows-states-miss-bankruptcy-mess.html [http://perma.cc/L33KT4Y3] (noting that all but one member of the village’s fire department had been laid off and
that the police chief had urged city leaders to shut down the department).
110
See Act 47 Financial Distress, PA. DEP’T COMMUNITY & ECON. DEV.,
http://www.newpa.com/local-government/services-we-provide-local-governments/requestassistance/list-act-47-distress-determinations [http://perma.cc/37CP-Z4K3] (last visited
Dec. 2, 2015) (listing distress determinations).
111
Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035,
1042 (1997).
112
Five Cities That Were Denied Chapter 9 Protection in the Past, MICH. RADIO (July
25, 2013), http://michiganradio.org/post/five-cities-were-denied-chapter-9-protection-past
[http://perma.cc/NU8Y-LKUV].
113
In re Slocum Lake Drainage Dist. of Lake Cty., 336 B.R. 387, 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2006) (“Independent research by the Court has not revealed any Illinois statute containing
the specific authorization required by § 109(c)(2).”).
114
Jim Suhr, Judge Throws Out Ill. Village’s Bankruptcy Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Jan. 10, 2011, 2:03 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/judge-throws-ill-villages-bankruptcy-case20110110-110319-519.html [http://perma.cc/7HRP-KLAL].
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eligibility. For example, the city of Millport, Alabama filed for bankruptcy after the
newly elected mayor discovered that the town was almost $3.5 million behind in
payments.115 The former administration neither budgeted nor properly accounted for
the town’s revenues and expenditures, making it difficult for the new administration
to document the city’s insolvency.116 Similarly, after the longtime mayor of Moffett,
Oklahoma died, the town learned that he had incurred large debts on the town’s
behalf without the knowledge or consent of its citizens.117 When financial distress
comes as a shock to citizens and officials, it can be difficult to gather the evidence
to definitively prove insolvency.118
As eligibility, rather than debt relief, becomes the focus, municipalities pour
time and resources that could otherwise be directed toward putting together a plan
of adjustment into the eligibility proceeding. The fiscal problems fade into the
background, as litigation takes up more and more of officials’ time. Several
examples illustrate this point.
The city of Vallejo, California spent three and a half months locked in an
eligibility battle, where resources were diverted from the debtor’s ultimate goal of
developing a plan and emerging from bankruptcy.119 The evidentiary hearing alone
went on for eight days, as the nondebtor parties pursued the litigation as a way to
gain leverage in their negotiations with the debtor.120 Although the eligibility issue
was ultimately decided in Vallejo’s favor, creditors promptly appealed, prolonging
the battle. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed Vallejo’s
eligibility over a year after Vallejo had initially filed its Chapter 9 petition.121
Although a multibillion-dollar company may well be able to handle the expense and
effort needed to engage in such protracted fights by cutting costs in other areas, a
city like Vallejo that is already struggling to provide basic public services cannot cut
services further in order to fight such a battle and may put itself further into debt in
order to keep the lights on while it establishes eligibility for Chapter 9 relief.
115

Keren H. Deal, An Examination of Municipal Finance Reform Regarding Municipal
Bankruptcies in the United States 165–66 (Aug. 4, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Auburn University), https://etd.auburn.edu/bitstream/handle/10415/956/DEAL_KEREN_
35.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/UQD7-D7KQ].
116
Id.
117
Tony Thornton & Sheila Stogsdill, Moffett Seeks Bankruptcy Protection: Town
Bears Toll of Designation as a Speed Trap and Debts Incurred by the Late Mayor, NEWSOK
(Feb. 2, 2007), http://newsok.com/moffett-seeks-bankruptcy-protectionbrspan-classhl2town
-bears-toll-of-designation-as-a-speed-trap-and-debts-incurred-by-the-late-mayor.span/
article/3007448 [http://perma.cc/MX2D-XNSF].
118
Even cities that have not experienced a significant change in administration may
find it difficult to assemble complete and accurate financial information. In Stockton,
California’s eligibility dispute, for example, creditors argued that Stockton was relying on
outdated financial data. See Preliminary Objection of Assured Guaranty Corp. and Assured
Guaranty Municipal Corp. to Debtor’s Chapter 9 Petition and Statement of Qualifications at
10–11, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012).
119
Glassman, supra note 76, at 215.
120
Id.
121
In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280, 285 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009).
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Also in California, Stockton and San Bernardino have followed in Vallejo’s
footsteps. It took almost a year for the bankruptcy court to decide that the city of
Stockton was eligible to be a Chapter 9 debtor.122 During this time, Stockton spent
an enormous amount of time and money just trying to stay in bankruptcy while its
infrastructure took a severe hit. Homicide rates jumped as police officers left the city
in droves.123 The city cut its workforce by 30% and its budget by $90 million.124 Far
from expressing concern over these alarming public health and safety conditions,
the creditors opposed to the city’s eligibility pressed on, using what Stockton’s city
manager called a “scorched-earth” strategy designed to make the city waste
additional time and money.125 By the time Stockton’s eligibility was finally decided,
the city had spent over $6 million on mediation and legal costs related to the
eligibility fight alone.126 This number represented approximately half of the money
Stockton had budgeted for its entire bankruptcy that year.127
Stockton’s eligibility battle illustrates that creditors’ incentives are generally
not aligned with the public health and safety concerns of a municipality. This is a
key contrast from a business bankruptcy, where creditors, shareholders, and the
debtor often see keeping the business going as a way to maximize value for all
parties involved.128
The city of San Bernardino, California took a year to get through its eligibility
fight.129 Even after it was deemed eligible for Chapter 9 relief, one creditor, the
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”), appealed the
eligibility decision, forcing the city to pay even more money fighting for eligibility,
when the real issue CalPERS cared about (nonpayment) was not at stake in the
122

In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 776–77 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
Cambi Brown, Stockton’s Homicide Rate Sees Drastic Drop Following RecordBreaking
Year,
CBS
SACRAMENTO
(Dec.
29,
2013,
11:12
PM),
http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2013/12/29/stocktons-homicide-rate-sees-drastic-dropfollowing-record-breaking-year/ [http://perma.cc/N6YP-52JZ] (noting that in 2012, “amidst
the city’s money trouble and bankruptcy, violence erupted” and that a “record-setting 71
people were murdered”).
124
Robin Respaut, Trial Starts Monday to Determine If Stockton Can Exit Bankruptcy,
REUTERS (May 11, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/11/municipalsstockton-preview-idUSL2N0NV1BO20140511 [http://perma.cc/CC85-4A64].
125
Jonathan Weber, Court Says City of Stockton, California May Proceed with
Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2013, 9:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/02/
us-stockton-bankruptcy-idUSBRE9300GP20130402 [https://perma.cc/DX75-JW4Y].
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Id.
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CITY OF STOCKTON, ANNUAL BUDGET 2013–2014, at A-14,
http://www.stocktongov.com/files/13-14_Adopted_Budget_.pdf [http://perma.cc/TW8EYAFU] (showing adopted budget for fiscal year 2013-2014 as approximately $12.5 million).
128
See Moberg & Wagner, supra note 55, at 32 (“In commercial corporations, the
interests of shareholders and managers are not in conflict with one another because they share
a common interest in efficient corporate operation.”).
129
Liz Farmer, San Bernardino Becomes 3rd California City to Get Bankruptcy
Protection, GOVERNING (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.governing.com/blogs/view/gov-judgeawards-san-bernardino-bankruptcy-protection.html [http://perma.cc/H8Q4-XF42].
123

326

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

eligibility hearing.130 San Bernardino’s eligibility battle is an example of how
creditors use eligibility as a proxy for another issue that they will have more
difficulty fighting once the debtor enters bankruptcy due to the limited powers of
the court and creditors in a Chapter 9 case.
Eligibility also sometimes requires courts to examine complex state law. The
question of eligibility for two Alabama municipalities, Jefferson County and
Prichard, was ultimately determined to require interpretation of an arcane state
statute.131 Thus, the bankruptcy cases were stayed while the question proceeded to
the Alabama Supreme Court.132 Prichard finally received permission to proceed two
and a half years after it had initially sought bankruptcy relief.133 During the interim
period, Prichard ceased paying pensions to its retirees.134
Finally, the city of Detroit spent nearly $23 million in fees to lawyers,
consultants, and financial advisers in the first three months of its bankruptcy
alone.135 A substantial amount of this money was spent in pursuit of an eligibility
determination.136 That determination took over four months, and seven different
entities appealed the determination, prolonging an already expensive and timeconsuming process.137
Clearly, eligibility battles can take a significant amount of time and divert
resources from both the debtor and creditors. All parties must hire attorneys and
devote time to briefing and litigating the eligibility elements. Further, although legal
fees must be disclosed in a Chapter 9 case, municipalities are not subject to
bankruptcy court approval of professional fee payments.138 This means that
130

C. Scott Pryor, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose. Or Is It the Other Way Around? PRYOR
THOUGHTS (Nov. 20, 2013), http://pryorthoughts.blogspot.com/2013/11/heads-i-win-tailsyou-lose-or-is-it.html [http://perma.cc/UNV5-9H33].
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See Darby et al., supra note 69, at 337–38 (citing the Jefferson County case, where
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interpretation of an old state statute).
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Will Hueske, Chapter 9 Update: Alabama Municipalities Eligible As “Debtors”
Under Section 109(c), WEIL BANKR. BLOG (May 22, 2012), http://business-financerestructuring.weil.com/chapter-9/chapter-9-update-alabama-municipalities-eligible-asdebtors-under-section-109c/ [http://perma.cc/Q999-E236].
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Cate Long, The Real History of Public Pensions in Bankruptcy, REUTERS:
MUNILAND (Aug. 8, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/2013/08/08/the-real-historyof-public-pensions-in-bankruptcy/ [http://perma.cc/QB4L-F2L9].
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Joseph Lichterman, Detroit Has Paid $23 Million to Consultants Through October
1, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2013, 7:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/21/us-usadetroit-fees-idUSBRE9AK01S20131121 [http://perma.cc/H5W9-HMGS].
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See id.
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Federal Court Asked to Suspend Detroit Bankruptcy Appeals, REUTERS (July 31,
2014, 7:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/31/usa-detroit-bankruptcyappeals-idUSL2N0Q63DH20140731 [http://perma.cc/8SDG-SHEM].
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JONES DAY, supra note 9, at 9. This is distinct from the Chapter 11 context, where
debtors are prohibited from retaining or paying professionals without bankruptcy court
approval. Id.
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municipalities could be unrestrained in terms of the fees they can run up in an
eligibility proceeding, and eligibility, of course, can take a substantial bite out of a
municipal entity’s operating budget.
The holdout creditor that Chapter 9 was designed to thwart is also usually the
individual creditor most directly affected by the impending Chapter 9 case and the
creditor most likely to spearhead the eligibility litigation.139 In contrast to Chapter
11, where access to bankruptcy court is straightforward, municipalities rarely have
unimpeded access to bankruptcy relief.140 Prolonged eligibility battles can hurt the
holdout creditor as well as the debtor, as the money that the debtor spends in an
eligibility fight is money that would otherwise be available to pay creditors or bolster
public services.
The justification for the stringent eligibility requirements lies in the Bankruptcy
Code drafters’ concern with ensuring that states maintained control over their
municipalities’ commercial affairs.141 The requirements reflect the drafters’
intention to give municipalities access to federal debt relief only if states approve.142
Although these concerns are important, in practice, the dual state and federal
approval systems create high barriers, which may ultimately harm the municipal
entities Chapter 9 was intended to help.
The very design of Chapter 9 encourages holdout creditors to stand their ground
and makes it difficult for entities in severe distress to access relief. The incentives
created by the eligibility requirements lead to exactly the opposite result of what
Chapter 9 was designed to achieve: the holdout creditor remains in play, and debtors
run up costs rather than reduce them. Given these harms, it is rightfully puzzling that
municipalities nevertheless continue to seek entry into Chapter 9. Although Chapter
9 may not be municipalities’ preferred option, it is worth exploring whether the
benefits are worth the struggle.
III. CHAPTER 9’S LIMITATIONS
As seen with eligibility hearings, elements of Chapter 9’s structure make it
difficult to utilize successfully in practice. Section II.A explores why corporate
bankruptcy is a poor model for municipal bankruptcy due to key structural and
theoretical differences between municipalities and corporations. Using recent
municipal bankruptcy cases, section II.B also illustrates that use of Chapter 9 often
results in outcomes that are inconsistent with foundational bankruptcy principles.
By demonstrating how Chapter 11 is an ill-fitting model for Chapter 9 and how
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Chapter 9 in practice diverges from optimal bankruptcy outcomes, this Part paves
the way for a call to reform the municipal bankruptcy system.
A. Key Differences Between Chapter 9 and Chapter 11
Once a municipality clears the eligibility hurdle, Chapter 9 is supposed to
provide municipalities with more power than a corporate debtor has in Chapter 11.143
This significant power is yet another reason the barriers to entry for Chapter 9 are
so high: it is thought that municipalities should not be able to wield this power
easily.144 On paper, a municipality’s powers do indeed seem substantial; in practice,
however, these powers are often not as significant as they seem. Municipalities
under political pressure, for example, may be hesitant to exercise their bankruptcy
powers to reform contracts or impair pensions.
The stark structural differences between a corporate entity and a municipality
indicate that Chapter 11 rules are ill-suited to resolve municipal financial problems.
For example, unlike a business, a city or town cannot be liquidated or sold to another
entity.145 Furthermore, the composition of claims holders in a municipal bankruptcy
looks very different from that of a business bankruptcy, making it difficult to figure
out how concepts that are well developed in Chapter 11 apply to Chapter 9.146 Rules
that work well in Chapter 11, such as those relating to debt adjustment, contract
assumption and rejection, financing, and plan confirmation, fail to reach the same
outcomes in Chapter 9.
1. Debt Adjustments
Debt adjustment is the central function of Chapter 9, yet the extent of debt that
can be adjusted is not always clear.147 For example, nonconsensual modification of
143

See, e.g., Kimhi, supra note 16, at 356. “[O]nce the bankruptcy filing is approved,
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144
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individual bankruptcy rather than corporate bankruptcy. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 41, at
2227–28.
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See, e.g., Richard L. Epling et al., Monorail, Monorail, Monorail: Chapter 9 and
Restructuring Issues Relating to Municipal Authorities, 20 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
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URB. LAW. 531, 531–32 (1995) (noting the similarity of general policy considerations
underlying municipal debt adjustment and Chapter 11 reorganization but stating that
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pensions is a hotly contested issue in Chapter 9.148 Some states have constitutional
provisions prohibiting municipalities from modifying or impairing accrued pension
benefits, raising the question of whether bankruptcy law can trump these
provisions.149 In other circumstances, municipal debtors sometimes favor pension
claims over other debt, raising questions about whether this is permissible under
bankruptcy priority rules.150 Pension obligations typically make up a significant
portion of a struggling municipality’s liabilities, making resolution of these issues
critical for an effective debt adjustment.151 The extent to which a municipality’s need
to protect city employees and encourage them to work for the municipality must be
reconciled with the municipality’s ability to rid itself of burdensome debt obligations
remains unresolved. This lack of clarity undermines predictability in the law, leaving
municipalities uncertain as to whether and how they may adjust pensions in
bankruptcy, and spurring on costly litigation in an attempt to resolve the matter.152
In contrast to Chapter 11, where most pre-petition debt is dischargeable, in
Chapter 9, municipalities may face limitations on the types of debt they can adjust.153
For example, special revenue bonds and leases are not eligible for adjustment in
Chapter 9.154 This means that in a bankruptcy like Detroit’s, where special revenue
debt made up over 30% of the city’s liabilities, the municipality will not be able to
municipal bankruptcy is “quite unlike” other bankruptcies and acknowledging that
“application of the term ‘bankruptcy’ to Chapter 9 is a misnomer”).
148
See generally Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Fair and Unfair Discrimination
in Municipal Bankruptcy (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 2014-56), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2493529 [http://perma.cc/J334YABW] (describing trend of municipalities offering more generous recovery on pension
claims than on other claims and arguing that bankruptcy’s unfair discrimination standard
prevents this outcome if disfavored creditors object).
149
See Chung, supra note 58, at 717–18. Some courts have answered this question in
the affirmative. See Lichterman & Woodall, supra note 89 (noting that the Michigan
Attorney General “argued that pension rights are protected by the state constitution,” but the
judge in the Detroit case cut pensions anyway).
150
Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Pensions and Property Rights in Municipal
Bankruptcy, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 609, 612 (2014) (summarizing the confusion over
payment priority between retirees and bondholders).
151
A recent study concluded that there was a $1 trillion gap between the amount
actually set aside by states and localities to pay pensions and other benefits, and the estimated
actual cost of those obligations. See Chung, supra note 58, at 669 (discussing the study and
its implications).
152
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Bernardino Bankruptcy, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 8, 2015, 12:36 PM),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/business/article5638170.html [http://perma.cc/2W3C-67QH].
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See Francisco Vazquez & Eric Daucher, Restructuring a Municipality Under
Chapter 9, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2010, at 50, 51–52.
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Part II, BUS. L. TODAY, June 2011, at 1, 2 (noting that “the legislative history to Chapter 9
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effectuate a complete debt adjustment.155 Municipalities may be further discouraged
from adjusting debts out of concern that impairing debt may limit their access to
capital markets and future funding.156
2. Contract Assumption and Rejection
One of the most touted advantages of Chapter 9 is that it gives municipal
debtors the ability to renegotiate and reject contracts.157 Indeed, this is a key
advantage of federal bankruptcy relief, which allows debtors to assume or reject
executory contracts, including collective bargaining agreements, despite contrary
state law provisions.158 For municipalities, this ability is limited in practice. Unlike
in Chapter 11, where the statute clearly provides the standard for rejection or
modification of a collective bargaining agreement,159 uncertainty remains in Chapter
9 as to whether and how a debtor may modify and reject these agreements.160 This
makes it difficult for municipal debtors to modify their agreements easily or
quickly.161
3. Financing
Another key distinction between municipal bankruptcy and business
bankruptcy further complicates the relief available to a municipality. In a business
case, the pre-petition and post-petition entities are often considered completely
separate. A line is drawn separating the pre-petition entity from the “new company”
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Trotter, supra note 15, at 81 (noting that the case law creates “a cloud of uncertainty
over the issues of modification and rejection of collective bargaining agreements in Chapter
9”).
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Proposed legislation would require employees to consent to changes in contracts,
including changes to pension and health-care benefits. William Selway, House Democrats
Seek to Protect Workers in Municipal Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG (July 17, 2014),
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municipalities to find relief and protecting promised core contract rights, it may undercut the
ability of a Chapter 9 debtor to renegotiate contracts in bankruptcy.
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or the “estate” once a company files for bankruptcy.162 This line drawing is often
reinforced by changes in management or even a sale of the company’s assets to a
new entity. In municipal bankruptcies, however, the line between the pre-petition
municipality and the post-petition entity is decidedly blurred. Although it has filed
for bankruptcy, the municipality lacks an “estate,” or a body of assets that creditors
can look to for recovery, in part because it lacks the ability to liquidate.163 Similarly,
the bankruptcy court lacks the ability to force the municipality to sell any property
for the benefit of creditors.164 In essence, no equivalent “new municipality” is forged
from the bankruptcy. Because the municipality can never completely separate itself
from its pre-bankruptcy “self,” as a business can, it may have a much more difficult
time emerging from bankruptcy as a financially and operationally sound entity.
This problem is evident when it comes to bankruptcy financing. Typically,
when a business files for bankruptcy, it may take advantage of Bankruptcy Code
provisions and obtain new funding to finance the costs of the case.165 Although the
same Code provisions apply in a Chapter 9 case, the court’s powers to order a
municipal debtor to comply with a lender’s typically exacting requirements are
extraordinarily limited.166 Thus, municipal entities typically do not receive postpetition financing in bankruptcy.167 Even once a municipality has come up with a
plan of adjustment, it may be on its own when it comes to finding the money to pay
creditors under that plan. The municipality may of course look to taxpayers to raise
revenue, but the ability to obtain financing from an outside lender could mitigate the
need to raise taxes, encouraging residents to remain in the municipality rather than
leave for a city or town with a lower tax rate.
4. Political Constraints
Municipalities are inherently political entities168 and may be influenced to a
greater degree than businesses by the state and local politics that surround them.
Many scholars have acknowledged Chapter 9’s inability to address certain political
problems, such as difficulties with mobilizing constituencies in support of debt
162
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adjustment or local officials’ vulnerability to political influence.169 Although no
form of bankruptcy is intended to address political problems head-on, in a municipal
bankruptcy, political problems are intertwined with the municipality’s financial
distress to a greater degree than in a corporate or personal bankruptcy.170 For
business bankruptcy, management’s ability to implement top-down policies is often
significant.171 In contrast, officials running a municipality are often subject to
extreme pressure from voters and interest groups.172 In some cases then, the solution
to a municipality’s fiscal problems may lie, not in a debt adjustment, but in
addressing the political incentives that drove the municipality to seek bankruptcy
relief in the first place.
Political problems may take the form of legal constraints on raising taxes or
seeking new funding sources, thus preventing the municipality from taking steps to
get its budget under control. For example, in California, Proposition 13 places a cap
on property taxes, and Proposition 218 requires municipalities to attain the vote of
property owners for any proposed new or increased assessments.173 The California
Constitution also contains prohibitions on the amounts of debt a city can incur.174 If
municipalities cannot easily raise new funds without resorting to the political
process, they will have a more difficult time emerging from bankruptcy successfully.
In general, taxpayers and residents of a municipality are not considered parties
in interest in a Chapter 9 case and therefore do not have a say in the bankruptcy’s
progress, aside from the officials they elect to represent them in the governance of
the municipality.175 Yet, because a municipality must receive regulatory and
electoral approval in order to carry out a plan, the debtor will likely have to deal with
the same political forces and community dynamics it faced outside of bankruptcy
while it is in bankruptcy.176 Chapter 9 cannot provide the municipality with the tools
169
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necessary to face these forces; however, without the ability to address political
problems, a municipality will not succeed in Chapter 9 anyway.
A separate concern is that Chapter 9 may artificially shield debtors from their
political problems. For example, observers of Stockton, California’s bankruptcy
case have argued that bankruptcy simply allows the city to make a debt adjustment
without requiring it to fix the real problems that led to its insolvency in the first
place, such as bad fiscal policies and unsustainable pension systems.177 A California
think tank that assessed the aftermath of the Orange County, California bankruptcy
in the 1990s also concluded that the main issue causing Orange County’s failure was
not a financial issue but a failure of governance.178 Thus, Chapter 9 cannot, by itself,
resolve underlying political issues and may in fact enable a municipality to hide
behind financial problems rather than address the political issues that have led it to
seek bankruptcy protection in the first place.
In order for a successful debt adjustment to occur, a municipality must often
confront the political forces surrounding it. This means that bankruptcy is going to
be an incomplete solution in the municipal context. Once again, due to key
differences between a municipality and a business, bankruptcy mechanisms that may
provide a more complete solution in Chapter 11 are at best only a partial solution in
Chapter 9.
5. The Holdout Creditor
A key benefit of bankruptcy is the ability to force parties to the bargaining table
and, if negotiations fail, to overcome holdout creditors by “cramming down” a plan
over their objections.179 By allowing the bankruptcy judge to approve a plan that is
feasible and fair, Chapter 9 can inhibit the holdout creditor’s desire to get more out
of the debtor than what it is actually entitled to.180 A close look at several recent
municipal bankruptcies shows, however, that Chapter 9 may not be effective at
getting the holdout creditor under control.
In the Detroit bankruptcy, the fight with holdout creditors Financial Guaranty
Insurance Company and Syncora Guarantee Inc. generated high fees that Detroit
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officials alleged the city could not pay.181 These creditors consistently fought against
Detroit’s eligibility for bankruptcy, even going so far as to argue for dismissal of the
case.182 Syncora even appealed a ruling about Detroit’s casino revenue all the way
to the Sixth Circuit.183 The bankruptcy judge finally forced the two holdouts into
mediation.184 Although the parties ultimately reached a deal with Detroit,185 the deal
came at a high cost: Detroit’s legal fees and expenses in fighting these creditors rose
to $26 million, while the cost of all professional services reported prior to the
confirmation hearing was approximately $55 million.186 Detroit’s political leaders
argued in court that they could not both pay the professional fees associated with
their bankruptcy and improve services for residents.187
Meanwhile in Stockton’s bankruptcy, Franklin Resources Inc. emerged as the
lone holdout creditor. Franklin objected strenuously to Stockton’s plan, which
purported to pay it a fraction of its investment.188 Although Stockton’s plan of
adjustment was ultimately confirmed, city officials spent $16 million on costs
associated with the bankruptcy.189 This represented 3% of Stockton’s annual
operating budget for 2013-14 and well over the $12.5 million in the fund the city
had set aside to pay for its bankruptcy.190 After Stockton emerged, the city was
predicted to owe almost $48 million in settlements and other obligations.191 Even
181
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then, Franklin threatened to appeal Stockton’s plan of adjustment and further
prolong the case.192
In San Bernardino, California, holdout unions impeded the city’s ability to
create a plan of adjustment and even harmed the union members they are supposed
to be helping. San Bernardino fought for years with its unions and with CalPERS.
These fights slowed progress in the case: the city filed for bankruptcy in August
2012 and had yet to file a plan of adjustment well over two years later.193 The slow
progress of the talks took a particularly heavy toll on union members, because the
unions could not fight pay cuts in the bankruptcy.194 As a result, some city
firefighters began declaring personal bankruptcy.195 The bankruptcy judge even
accused the unions of “stonewalling” negotiations after they attempted to sue the
city in state court during the bankruptcy case.196
Bankruptcy law offers an alternative to these long, drawn-out fights with
holdout creditors: confirm a plan of adjustment over the holdout creditor’s objection.
This so-called “cramdown power” is utilized extensively in Chapter 11 cases, but is
practically nonexistent in Chapter 9. In Chapter 9, the plan eventually presented to
the court is almost always a consensual one, reached after months or years of
negotiations.197 Thus, Chapter 9 in effect often functions as a drawn-out settlement
process. For example, in Detroit, the judicial mediator ordered the city and its major
creditors to “keep talking until they come to an agreement.”198 By forcing the city to
keep negotiating with creditors in lieu of allowing it to utilize the bankruptcy
cramdown tool, the mediator took away one of the key benefits of municipal
bankruptcy.
Why is the cramdown option almost never exercised in Chapter 9? The answer
may stem from the uncertainty of how to apply the cramdown requirements in a
municipal bankruptcy case. For example, a plan that is crammed down may not
192
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did not apply. See Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings, Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law at 17–18, In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 1232118-C-9).
198
Karen Pierog & Lisa Lambert, Detroit End in Sight as Deals Leave FGIC Last Major
Bankruptcy
Holdout,
REUTERS
(Sept.
12,
2014,
6:08
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-idUSKBN0H72IN20140912
[http://perma.cc/K2K5-GCNQ].
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discriminate unfairly against a class of claims that does not accept the plan.199 Courts
that have applied this standard in Chapter 9 have done so inconsistently, leading
scholars to question whether they are complying with the standard.200 Creditors
objecting to a plan may also argue that the plan fails to meet the “best interests of
creditors” test, which in Chapter 11 requires creditors to receive as much as they
would if the debtor’s plan were converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation.201 In a Chapter
9 case, where liquidation is not an option, courts struggle with how to decide whether
a plan in fact meets the best interests test.202 These uncertainties in plan confirmation
standards in turn may make a debtor’s plan susceptible to challenges, even once it is
confirmed.203
In the absence of Chapter 9, the holdout creditor could theoretically never come
to the bargaining table at all. Still, when judges hesitate to utilize cramdown, and
instead force parties to mediate (or litigate), Chapter 9 becomes more costly and
difficult than it needs to be. If the application of Chapter 11-based cramdown rules
is too uncertain, perhaps Chapter 9 needs its own set of rules.204
Bankruptcy is typically described as a collective process.205 In Chapter 9, this
process becomes a tug-of-war. Highly publicized battles rage between the debtor
and one or two holdout creditors. These battles are not mere hypotheticals; in fact,
the bankruptcy judge in Detroit explicitly asked the city and one of its holdout

199

11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012); see also Gary L. Kaplan, Understanding the Rules
of
Bankruptcy
Cramdown,
LAW360
(Sept.
4,
2013,
3:31
PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/468678/understanding-the-rules-of-bankruptcy-cramdown
[http://perma.cc/97N3-L9TS] (explaining that the rules of bankruptcy cramdown do not
allow for unfair discrimination).
200
See Hynes & Walt, supra note 148, at 19–23 (noting that courts applying the unfair
discrimination standard in Chapter 9 have used it to favor retirees over other creditors,
potentially contravening bankruptcy law).
201
Bret A. Maidman, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: An Overview, NOLO,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/chapter-11-bankruptcy-overview.html [http://
perma.cc/3MH5-VN35] (last visited Dec. 2, 2015).
202
David A. Skeel, Jr., From Chrysler and General Motors to Detroit, 24 WIDENER
L.J. 121, 142–43 (2015) (noting that the “best interest of the creditors” test is unclear because
“liquidation is not an option for a municipal debtor”).
203
See, e.g., Nathan Bomey, A Few Retirees Still Fighting Detroit Bankruptcy Plan,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Jan. 8, 2015, 6:40 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/
detroit-bankruptcy/2015/01/08/detroit-bankruptcy-retirees-pension-cuts/21445939/ [http://
perma.cc/8KFW-77EP].
204
See Hynes & Walt, supra note 148, at 31–32 (arguing that the reason Stockton’s
holdout creditor objected so strenuously was related to problems with interpreting the unfair
discrimination standard in municipal bankruptcy); Skeel, supra note 202, at 144 (“[T]he
precise contours of unfair discrimination [in the Chapter 9 context] are unsettled.”).
205
See, e.g., Laura Napoli Coordes, The Geography of Bankruptcy, 68 VAND. L. REV.
381, 408 (2015); Skeel, supra note 41, at 2233 (“[Bankruptcy] is collective in nature. A
bankruptcy framework adjusts the debtor’s relationship with most or all of its
creditors . . . . ”).
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creditors to stop using war analogies to describe their disagreements.206 In the
meantime, taxpayers and employees are left to suffer as the city’s attention and effort
become consumed with dragging the holdouts to the bargaining table at any cost in
order to eke out a few concessions. Although holdout creditors exist in the Chapter
11 context, the ability of the court to play a more significant role in a Chapter 11
case, and in particular the debtor’s well-defined ability to exercise the cramdown
power, limit the extent to which holdout creditors can wage war on the Chapter 11
debtor.
Although holdout creditors may eventually settle with municipal debtors, they
are central players that inflict substantial harms during the life of a Chapter 9
bankruptcy. Just as they do with eligibility battles, holdout creditors at the plan
confirmation stage can wage an all-consuming war on debtors that diverts resources
away from debtor rehabilitation. Thus, although Chapter 9 may eventually drive
parties to settlement,207 it is not clear that such settlement maximizes value for the
debtor, the creditors, or taxpayers. Instead, the very structure of Chapter 9 allows
holdout creditors to use the bankruptcy process to dig in their heels until the last
possible second, dragging out a painful and expensive case for months or even years.
Despite Chapter 9’s aim to resolve the holdout creditor problem, a holdout creditor’s
power in a Chapter 9 case is substantial.
6. The Aftermath of Chapter 9
Due to the problems with utilizing Chapter 9, cities and towns emerging from
bankruptcy may find themselves financially worse off than they were prior to filing
for bankruptcy. In fact, municipalities that have filed for Chapter 9 may return to
insolvency within just a few years of filing.208 Although courts are required to
determine that a municipality’s plan of adjustment is feasible prior to confirming the
plan,209 cities that have emerged from bankruptcy often struggle to provide even
basic services after their bankruptcy exit, indicating that judicial findings of
feasibility may be inaccurate. Multiple examples illustrate this point.
The city of Vallejo, California emerged from Chapter 9 in 2011, but is still
mired in pension debt and struggling to provide basic public services, in direct
contrast with the core purpose of Chapter 9.210 According to Vallejo’s city manager,

206

Nathan Bomey, Detroit Bankruptcy Judge to Consider Sanctions for Syncora
Attorneys, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 25, 2014, 12:03 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/
news/local/michigan/detroit/2014/08/25/detroit-bankruptcy-judge-to-consider-sanctionsfor-syncora-attorneys-/14532517/ [https://perma.cc/9ZE9-B2GU].
207
C. Scott Pryor, Stockton Status, PRYOR THOUGHTS (Oct. 14, 2013),
http://pryorthoughts.blogspot.com/search?q=stockton+status [http://perma.cc/LS9Z-EJ2T].
208
Kishfy, supra note 14, at 362.
209
11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012).
210
In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999) (“[T]he
legislative purpose underlying [Chapter 9] . . . is to allow an insolvent municipality to
restructure its debts in order to continue to provide public services.”).
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the city’s police department remains “woefully understaffed.”211 Even while it was
in bankruptcy, Vallejo was unable to borrow money to maintain its streets or replace
police or fire vehicles.212 After the city cut its police and fire forces by nearly 50%,
incidences of violent crime rose.213 Although Chapter 9 helped the city save $34
million through debt adjustments and rejection of labor agreements, Vallejo spent
over $13 million on legal fees related to the bankruptcy proceeding.214 After
emerging from bankruptcy, Vallejo was unable to access the debt markets to obtain
additional funding because, despite its financial reorganization, it still could not
afford to pay for interest on loans.215 A post-bankruptcy analysis confirmed that
because Vallejo had not been able to significantly reduce labor costs, a key goal of
its bankruptcy filing, the bankruptcy had been unsuccessful.216 Today, Vallejo
remains “beset by poverty, gangs and crime.”217 As one commentator put it, anyone
looking at Vallejo’s bankruptcy “has to question a process that takes three years to
complete and results in confirmation of a plan of adjustment that leaves the city with
a $3.4 million dollar shortfall in its first post-bankruptcy budget.”218 In the end,
Vallejo’s condition got worse, not better, after its bankruptcy filing.219
Jefferson County, Alabama remains under court oversight as it struggles with
debt in the aftermath of its bankruptcy. Although Jefferson County emerged from
bankruptcy in 2013, a group of local residents and leaders have continued to fight to
void parts of the county’s bankruptcy plan.220 The group has filed a federal lawsuit
against Jefferson County, arguing that a sewer rate increase included in the county’s
plan treats residents unfairly and places the county’s most vulnerable residents at
211

Melanie Hicken, Once Bankrupt, Vallejo Still Can’t Afford Its Pricey Pensions,
CNN MONEY (Mar. 10, 2014, 10:44 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/10/pf/vallejopensions/ [http://perma.cc/K2RS-6QDU].
212
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL
DISTRESS 14 (2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2013/07/23/pew_state_role_
in_local_government_financial_distress.pdf [https://perma.cc/972Q-8ADT].
213
Id.
214
Id.; see also Bobby White, Bankruptcy Exit Approved for City, WALL STREET J.
(Aug. 6, 2011) (on file with the Utah Law Review), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014
24053111903885604576486402778541450.
215
White, supra note 214.
216
Jane Wells, A New Chapter for Vallejo, CNBC (July 28, 2011, 5:05 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/43932782 [https://perma.cc/5D5R-28HS] (citing a report from
Bank of America).
217
Ellen Knickmeyer, California Earthquake Marks First Major Test of Hard-Luck
City of Vallejo After Bankruptcy, CANADIAN BUS. (Aug. 26, 2014),
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/business-news/california-earthquake-marks-first-majortest-of-hard-luck-city-of-vallejo-after-bankruptcy/ [perma.cc/3EGW-2MSU].
218
Denniston, supra note 102, at 273.
219
See Wolfe, supra note 104, at 558 (“Vallejo’s problems worsened after its discharge
from bankruptcy.”).
220
Verna Gates, Alabama County Ratepayers Say Sewer Bankruptcy Settlement Too
Pricey, REUTERS (July 21, 2014, 6:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/21/usabankruptcy-jeffersoncounty-idUSL2N0PW1SN20140721 [https://perma.cc/7THQ-5W4G].
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risk.221 In court, representatives of the group have also argued that the city’s debt
adjustment plan has increased, rather than decreased, the county’s overall debt.222
The County is also facing litigation over whether the bankruptcy court’s authority
to oversee sewer rates is constitutional.223 Thus, Jefferson County continues to fight
legal, political, and financial battles224 even after emerging from Chapter 9, and
questions remain over whether the county’s plan treated creditors in accordance with
bankruptcy law.225
A post-bankruptcy policy analysis for Orange County, California concluded
that the county remained vulnerable years after its exit from bankruptcy. The report
determined that the bankruptcy had disproportionately affected the county’s poor:
“[t]heir services were cut during the bankruptcy” and had not, even two years after
emergence, “been fully restored.”226 The report also concluded that by filing for
bankruptcy, Orange County had ruined its credit, worsened relations with other local
governments, and had “painted itself into a corner” in order to repay those
governments.227 In other words, rather than strengthening Orange County’s financial
condition, the municipal bankruptcy process had created challenges, making it
difficult for the county to succeed financially.
Although it has not yet emerged from bankruptcy, San Bernardino, California,
which has spent over three years in Chapter 9, recently defaulted on $10 million in
bond payments228 and warned that it may have to contract out essential services to
221

Id.
Id.; see also Chung, supra note 58, at 699 (noting that Jefferson County’s debt “has
not gone away”).
223
Frank Shafroth, The Intergovernmental & Governance Challenges to Municipal
Sustainability, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (June 18, 2015),
https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/06/18/the-intergovernmental-governancechallenges-to-municipal-sustainability/ [https://perma.cc/Z2A6-S4N9].
224
In early 2015, a report surfaced that Jefferson County was still paying millions of
dollars in fees to its bankruptcy attorneys. See Barnett Wright, Why Jefferson County Still
Pays Millions to Lawyers for a Bankruptcy That Ended in 2013, AL.COM. (Mar. 16, 2015,
9:47 AM), http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2015/03/why_jefferson_county_
continues.html [https://perma.cc/P8XA-JYLL].
225
The city of Desert Hot Springs, California, is another example of how Chapter 9 is
not always able to help municipalities restructure unsustainable debt. The city filed for
bankruptcy in 2001 and, as of 2014, was still struggling to pay off the $9.7 million in bond
debt that it had borrowed to pay off its largest creditor from the bankruptcy. See Juan Verala
Luz, Desert Hot Springs, California, Declares “Fiscal Emergency,” WSWS (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/01/15/dhs-j15.html [https://perma.cc/S8UH-U2UJ].
226
PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., supra note 178, at 14.
227
Id. at 16. Despite the report’s conclusion that Orange County’s credit had been hurt,
Orange County was able to borrow from new lenders during and after its bankruptcy
proceeding. See Kordana, supra note 111, at 1077 (“[N]ew lenders stepped forward during
Orange County’s bankruptcy proceedings despite the very real prospect that old lenders
would not be paid in full.”).
228
Tim Reid, Exclusive: San Bernardino Has Defaulted on $10 Million in Bond
Payments, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2015, 10:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/18/
222
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the county or state.229 The city is facing enormous pressure from its police and
firefighter unions to produce a viable bankruptcy plan, and voters have rejected a
ballot measure to reduce pay for police and firefighters.230 These events have left
San Bernardino at an impasse in its bankruptcy case.231 Legal fees are projected to
reach $10 million, representing nearly a quarter of the city’s budget deficit.232 San
Bernardino’s impending inability to provide essential services is the opposite of the
result Chapter 9 is supposed to help it achieve.
It would be foolish to conclude that bankruptcy provides a solution to all of the
problems affecting a city or town, and it would be equally foolish to suggest that the
entities profiled above entered bankruptcy with the expectation that all of their
problems would be resolved at no cost. Yet, the bankruptcy process has often served
to root these municipalities more deeply into poor financial conditions. Bankruptcy
is not preparing these entities for financial stability, and the examples above
illustrate that municipalities that emerge from bankruptcy often have a difficult time
resolving their problems and managing their debts.233 While they are in bankruptcy,
these municipalities rack up substantial legal costs, diverting resources away from
debt adjustment mechanisms and toward litigation with holdout creditors.
Of course, part of the problem may lie not with the bankruptcy process itself
but with the fact that municipalities cannot liquidate.234 A business in a Chapter 11
case may liquidate, selling off its assets, if it is determined that the business will
continue to struggle in the aftermath of a bankruptcy. Municipal entities, in contrast,
usually continue to operate, even if rehabilitating them is disproportionately
difficult. In certain cities, conditions may be so poor that it is impossible to
rehabilitate the municipality without incurring significant collateral consequences.
Although liquidation is not an option for cities, dissolution may be; however, a
municipality must pay its debts before it can dissolve, and creditors cannot force a

us-usa-municipals-bernardino-exclusive-idUSKBN0MD2LL20150318 [https://perma.cc/T
Y8Z-PNSS].
229
Tim Reid, Bankrupt San Bernardino, Calif., Warns It May Contract Out Services,
Raise Debt, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2014, 6:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/06/
usa-municipals-bernardino-idUSL1N0SW3HB20141106 [https://perma.cc/HAW9-FAW2].
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Tim Reid, Exclusive: Bankrupt San Bernardino Has Paid $6 Million Legal Fees,
Millions More Expected, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2014, 10:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/12/03/us-usa-municipals-sanbernardino-idUSKCN0JH1PM20141203 [http://
perma.cc/K74J-KPPM].
233
Although it is difficult to pinpoint a measure of success for a city in bankruptcy,
economic viability may be one measure of success. See Michelle M. Harner & Jamie
Marincic Griffin, Facilitating Successful Failures, 66 FLA. L. REV. 205, 214 (2014) (“An
optimal restructuring . . . facilitates the reorganization of economically viable firms.”).
234
Although cities cannot liquidate in the same way that a business can, they can
“dissolve,” or unincorporate. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121
YALE L.J. 1364, 1367 (2012) (“A municipality can dissolve in order to disincorporate
permanently . . . .”).
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city’s dissolution the way that they can force a business to liquidate.235 Although
municipal bankruptcy is not currently seen as a complementary measure to
municipal dissolution, perhaps it should be explored as such, given the difficulty of
rehabilitating certain municipalities.
In their classic article, When Cities Go Broke, Professors Michael McConnell
and Randal Picker stated, “[t]he premise of municipal bankruptcy law is that the city
will emerge from bankruptcy in the same form—with the same boundaries,
resources, functions, and governing structure—with which it entered bankruptcy.”236
It has now been over twenty years since that article’s publication, and the cities and
towns that have filed during that time illustrate that municipal bankruptcy fails to
meet this basic premise. Although a city that emerges from bankruptcy these days
may arguably retain its boundaries, its resources have often taken a dramatic hit, and
the functions and services it once provided may no longer be readily available.
As the examples in this Article illustrate, cities and towns that enter Chapter 9
pay a large sum of money and expend a lot of resources to adjust only some of their
debts and to engage in an expensive tug-of-war with holdout creditors and contract
counterparties. In the end, many of these municipalities are still mired in financial
and structural trouble upon emerging from bankruptcy,237 whether due to unresolved
debt or pension issues, political problems, or new debts from legal fees incurred
during the bankruptcy.238 For these entities, Chapter 9 functions as bankruptcy
without bite, a costly and time-consuming process that fails to meet its basic goals.
To quote one practitioner, “it remains unclear whether Chapter 9 is an effective tool
to comprehensively restructure municipal bond debt.”239 Although defenders
continue to rally around Chapter 9 as the last best option for struggling
municipalities, the outcomes for cities that have utilized Chapter 9 should lead
policymakers to question whether the current system makes sense and how it might
be improved.
235

Id. at 1381–82.
McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 427; See also David S. Kupetz, Municipal
Debt Adjustment, 42 FED. LAW. 18, 18 (1995) (“Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code . . . is
designed to enable a financially distressed municipality to continue to provide essential
services to residents while working out a plan to adjust its debts.”).
237
See, e.g., Joe Barrett & Ben Kesling, Detroit Hit by Power Outage As Infrastructure
Is Blamed, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 2, 2014, 6:14 PM) (on file with the Utah Law Review),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/power-outage-hits-downtown-detroit-1417539066
(quoting
Detroit’s mayor as saying, “The bankruptcy order doesn’t solve the decades of neglect in our
infrastructure”).
238
Regarding fees, § 943(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code requires municipal debtors to
disclose all amounts to be paid for services and expenses in the bankruptcy case and also
requires all amounts to be reasonable. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(3) (2012). The Code does not,
however, “authorize the allowance or require the payment of professional-fee claims.
Generally, the [municipal] debtor’s obligation to pay professionals will be governed by
nonbankruptcy law.” DABNEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 68 (citing Cty. of Orange v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., Inc. (In re Cty. Of Orange), 241 B.R. 212 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999)). For more
information, see Id. at 57–72.
239
Kevane, supra note 73, at 3.
236
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B. A Failure of Bankruptcy Law
Chapter 9 contravenes many of the broader goals of bankruptcy law. Chapter
9’s wide application to entities from a sewer district to an entire county makes it
difficult for courts to develop uniform rules and workable precedent to apply in
municipal bankruptcy. The lack of clear rules in turn prevents Chapter 9 from
providing the predictable, orderly approach to restructuring that bankruptcy law is
supposed to embody.240 Sparse relevant case law, combined with unclear standards
for eligibility and confirmation,241 makes Chapter 9 difficult to use as a bankruptcy
tool and can even lead to confusion when the municipality is initially developing its
funding sources and debt issuances.242
Chapter 9 is an overextension of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, one that is asserted to
address problems, such as political instability and governance issues, that
bankruptcy was never designed or intended to address. On a practical level, the
cumbersome interplay between state authorization and federal law creates eligibility
and confirmation hurdles that make municipal bankruptcy cases difficult to
administer.243
Although both Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 are designed to achieve basic
bankruptcy outcomes, the chapter-specific incentives leading to those outcomes are
very different. As discussed above, municipalities cannot be liquidated in a
bankruptcy and must continue to provide vital health and safety services to their
citizens.244 In contrast, citizens do not typically rely on corporations for the provision
of health and safety services, and corporations may be liquidated if it is determined
that the corporation is no longer valuable as a going concern. These differences drive
the different goals underlying each chapter. Chapter 11 exists to maximize the value
of the entity utilizing it; Chapter 9 exists so that a municipality may survive.245

240

See David A. Skeel, Jr., Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?,
50 HOUS. L. REV. 1063, 1089 (2013) (arguing that a bankruptcy mechanism for states would
provide a “predictable and orderly approach”).
241
See, e.g., Bill Rochelle & Sherri Toub, Detroit Judge Steven Rhodes Used
Conscience to Approve Plan, 26 BANKR. L. REP. (BNA) 1593, 1600 (2014) (noting that
Judge Rhodes answered the most difficult questions with respect to Detroit’s debtadjustment plan “by looking to his conscience and sense of morality”).
242
See Epling et al., supra note 146, at 237 (“Predictability would do much to ensure
that municipal authorities . . . can accurately assess their bankruptcy options when
structuring a revenue bond issuance . . . .”).
243
For example, shortly after Detroit filed for bankruptcy, questions arose over whether
the city could use Chapter 9 to restructure accrued pension benefits in light of provisions in
the Michigan Constitution prohibiting the impairment of contractual obligations as well as
pension obligations. See Chung, supra note 14, at 776–77.
244
See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
245
Andrew B. Dawson, Pensioners, Bondholders, and Unfair Discrimination in
Municipal Bankruptcy, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 5 (2014) (“[W]hile Chapter 11 serves the
dual . . . purposes of promoting reorganization and of maximizing returns to creditors,
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Modeling the bulk of Chapter 9 on a Bankruptcy Code section aimed at fulfilling
different purposes for different types of entities makes little sense.
Although the purposes of Chapter 11 and Chapter 9 are vastly different, both
chapters are designed to embody bankruptcy’s ability to carry out key functions,
such as contract modification, elimination of debt overhang, and overcoming the
holdout creditor.246 The Chapter 11 toolkit largely achieves these functions in the
Chapter 11 context. Chapter 9, however, needs different tools to achieve these same
results, tools that are lacking in Chapter 9’s current incarnation.247
This does not mean that a federal bankruptcy option is useless for
municipalities. In fact, there may be great value in allowing municipalities to take
advantage of federal bankruptcy law.248 Alternatives to Chapter 9, such as bailouts
or state financial distress programs, often either do not work, leaving cities to
struggle for years,249 or, in the case of bailouts, work too well, possibly creating
incentives for cities to be lax in their financial monitoring.250 Furthermore, only
federal law can provide for nonconsensual contract modification,251 and in other
contexts, bankruptcy law has succeeded in achieving the objectives outlined above.
Unfortunately, Chapter 9 in its current form simply does not serve the purposes that
bankruptcy law was designed to fulfill.

Chapter 9’s purpose is solely to confirm a debt composition plan.”); Kimhi, supra note 59,
at 673.
246
See supra section III.A.
247
Perhaps because of these different goals, there may be different stigmas associated
with using Chapter 9 or Chapter 11. For example, Chapter 11 may be associated more with
rehabilitating a business than with an admission of failure. In contrast, Chapter 9 may be
viewed as a tool of last resort, to be used only when all other options have failed. This may
explain why many businesses have taken advantage of Chapter 11, while few municipalities
have turned to Chapter 9.
248
See Skeel, supra note 240, at 1082 (arguing that recent municipal bankruptcies “have
signaled that Chapter 9 is indeed an option—and an alternative to rescue financing”).
249
For example, Pennsylvania encourages its struggling cities to utilize Act 47, a state
receivership and coordination program, in lieu of Chapter 9. Cf. David DeKok, Broke
Shamokin, Pennsylvania, Seeks State Crutch That Few Cast Off, REUTERS (May 2, 2014,
7:00
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/02/usa-pennsylvania-municipalsidUSL2N0N91ZV20140502 [perma.cc/EMT7-YMJX]. Unfortunately, municipalities often
remain in the program for decades. See id. The city of Scranton, for example, has been
designated “as distressed under the Act since 1992.” Steve McConnell, Westfall Twp.’s Firstin-the-State Bankruptcy May Not Be Pennsylvania’s Last, SCRANTON TIMES-TRIBUNE.COM
(Mar. 22, 2010), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/westfall-twp-s-first-in-the-statebankruptcy-may-not-be-pennsylvania-s-last-1.695242 [perma.cc/2MWY-8QTF].
250
See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 240, at 1080 (noting that the case for adopting formal
restructuring rules is very strong when either bailout or default is the most likely outcome in
a crisis).
251
11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (2012) (“[A] State law prescribing a method of composition of
indebtedness . . . may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such composition . . . .”).
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A key principle of bankruptcy law is the fair and equitable treatment of
creditors’ claims.252 In Chapter 9, however, it is admittedly difficult to figure out
how to achieve this treatment. Unlike in a business case, where the relative priorities
of secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and equity holders are generally
established, in a Chapter 9 case, the priorities are not so clear.253 Concerns about
who should bear most of the risk of a Chapter 9 debtor’s nonpayment continue to
dominate discussions in both scholarly literature and in case law.254 The law is also
in flux about when a municipality must attempt to raise revenues (for example, by
252

See Hynes & Walt, supra note 150, at 613 (“Bankruptcy law begins with the
principle of an equal distribution among creditors . . . .”); Skeel, supra note 23, at 703 (“But
the principle of equal treatment of similarly situated creditors is deeply entrenched, and
bankruptcy law is designed to encourage a fair distribution of the sacrifice.”).
253
For example, in Detroit’s bankruptcy case, the city’s proposal to pay its retirees more
than its bond investors was contested by bond insurers who argued that such a distribution
would be illegal. See Steven Church, Detroit Bond Insurer Says Plan Causes ‘Serious
Mayhem,’ BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2014, 11:33 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201409-03/detroit-bond-insurer-says-plan-causes-serious-mayhem-.html [https://perma.cc/U3Y
Q-AQQJ]. The bankruptcy judge was tasked with deciding this issue as part of his
determination as to whether Detroit’s plan was “fair and feasible.” Id.; see also B. Summer
Chandler, Is It “Fair” to Discriminate in Favor of Pensioners in a Chapter 9 Plan?, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2014, at 22, 22 (discussing the issue of whether a plan of adjustment
may be approved if it provides a greater recovery to pensioners compared with recoveries
offered to other creditors of the same priority); Steven Church, San Bernardino Sued for
Favoring Pensions over Bondholders, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8, 2015, 8:46 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-08/san-bernardino-sued-for-favoringpensions-over-bondholders-1- [http://perma.cc/THV8-NP48] (describing the lawsuit against
San Bernardino for continuing to pay the state’s retirement system without giving equal
treatment to pension bondholders); Dawson, supra note 245, at 7 (noting that there are no
priority unsecured claims in municipal bankruptcy other than administrative expense
claims).
254
For example, in the City of Stockton’s bankruptcy case, the judge confirmed
Stockton’s plan of adjustment even though it contemplated paying retirees a greater share of
what they were owed than other creditors. See Mary Williams Walsh, Judge Approves
Bankruptcy Exit for Stockton, Calif., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2014, 3:35 PM) (on file with the
Utah Law Review), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/judge-approves-bankruptcyexit-for-stockton-calif/. Prioritizing retirees in this manner is not clearly contemplated by the
Bankruptcy Code, and some scholars thus believe that the Stockton plan is bad bankruptcy
law. See C. Scott Pryor, BIG News from Stockton. Maybe., PRYOR THOUGHTS (Oct. 2, 2014),
http://pryorthoughts.blogspot.com/2014/10/big-news-from-stockton-maybe.html [http://
perma.cc/Z99P-QNVK]; C. Scott Pryor, Stockton Confirmed!, PRYOR THOUGHTS (Oct. 31,
2014), http://pryorthoughts.blogspot.com/2014/10/stockton-confirmed.html?utm_source
=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PryorThoughts+%28Pryor
+Thoughts%29 [http://perma.cc/42FW-HKHJ]; see also Romy Varghese, California Issuers
Risk Higher Costs with Stockton: Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22 2014, 11:33 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-22/california-issuers-risk-higher-costs-withstockton-muni-credit.html [http://perma.cc/89K8-9X9M] (noting that, because Stockton’s
plan paid certain investors less than they were owed, other California localities may see
borrowing costs rise).
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taxing) before it can impose cuts on its creditors and whether a municipality that
seeks to impair one group of creditors must treat other creditors similarly.255
Uncertain outcomes in Chapter 9 may give municipalities an incentive to settle with
creditors instead of allowing a court to decide the issue.256 These settlements have
the advantage of allowing the municipality to avoid cramming down a plan over the
objections of creditors. Yet, the settlements impose their own costs by decreasing
the amount of assets available to be split among the remaining creditors.
Furthermore, if Chapter 9 becomes simply about forcing parties to settle, the
municipality must pay a heavy entrance fee to those settlement negotiations in the
form of the eligibility battle that is almost certain to occur at the start of the Chapter
9 case.257
The basic dichotomy between economic and financial distress further illustrates
the difficulty with using Chapter 11 rules in Chapter 9. The economic/financial
distress dichotomy is used in bankruptcy literature predominantly to distinguish
between two types of financial distress facing corporations.258 Economic distress
results when a corporation’s operating expenses are consistently higher than its
revenues, while financial distress occurs when a corporation faces a short-term
inability to pay back debts. Bankruptcy may be seen as an ineffective mechanism
for combating economic distress, but as an effective mechanism for dealing with
financial distress. This is because bankruptcy may do little to address the underlying,
operational problems of an economically distressed entity, but bankruptcy can help
remedy a short-term debt problem by eliminating these debt obligations and
allowing the entity to continue to function as a going concern.
In the municipal context, however, a municipality’s economic and financial
problems are often inextricably intertwined.259 A municipality’s financial situation
is very often governed by the same substantive laws, policies, and procedures by
which the municipality itself is governed. If bankruptcy is a tool to predominantly
address financial distress, other mechanisms will be necessary in every municipal
case to address the causes of the municipality’s economic distress. Chapter 9 on its
own cannot provide this remedy.260 Further, a municipality’s economic and financial
problems are in turn intertwined with state and federal problems. Unlike a business,
255
Lee R. Bogdanoff, Understanding Chapter 9 in Today’s Economic Environment, in
CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES 49 (2011).
256
B. Summer Chandler & Mark S. Kaufman, Maybe Taxes Aren’t So Certain: What
Is “Fair and Equitable” in a Chapter 9 Plan?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2013, at 12, 13.
257
See supra section II.B.
258
See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 41, at 2235 (“[T]here is a well recognized distinction
between economic failure (a firm should be shuttered) and financial failure (liabilities exceed
assets).”).
259
See supra section III.A.4.
260
See, e.g., Alison Vekshin & Michael Bathon, Stockton’s Costly Bankruptcy May Not
Tempt
Other
Cities,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
30,
2014,
10:01
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-31/stockton-s-costly-bankruptcy-may-nottempt-other-cities.html [http://perma.cc/9H9V-JYTS] (noting that Stockton’s exit from
bankruptcy “doesn’t change the difficult economic environment”).
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a municipality is never truly a discrete entity—it is always a creature of the state
and/or federal government.
In short, although Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 share some key bankruptcy
purposes, such as resolution of the holdout creditor problem261 and the elimination
of debt overhang,262 Chapter 9 needs a vastly different toolkit to achieve those goals.
In theory, Chapter 9 was designed to help struggling municipalities regain their
footing by imbuing them with greater powers. But in practice, Chapter 9’s use of
Chapter 11’s tools brings together a group of seriously weakened agents. To move
forward, it is necessary to articulate and clarify the role federal bankruptcy law
should play in municipal distress, establish a new toolkit for municipal debtors, and
clearly delineate the roles various intertwined entities—municipalities, states, and
the federal government—should play in alleviating municipal financial distress.263
IV. MOVING FORWARD
Discussed previously, Parts II and III illustrate that Chapter 9’s toolkit, modeled
off of Chapter 11, fails to achieve the aims of bankruptcy generally and those of
Chapter 9 in particular. Instead of adapting Chapter 9 as each new municipal crisis
unfolds, the time is ripe to focus on holistic reform. If federal bankruptcy is to remain
an option for municipalities, the structure of Chapter 9 must be reconsidered.
Using the analysis from Parts II and III, Part IV suggests several starting points
for Chapter 9 reform, each seeking to align Chapter 9 with bankruptcy law and make
Chapter 9 more effective as a bankruptcy tool.264 Section A identifies three broad
261

See Kimhi, supra note 16, at 357, 363–65; see also To Amend the Bankruptcy Act
Municipal and Private Corporations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 73d
Cong. 22 (1933) (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox) (“In every instance where a
governmental unit finds itself in financial difficulty and is able to make some satisfactory
agreement of adjustment with the majority of its creditors, there is always a small minority
who hold out and demand preferential treatment. These minority creditors are prompted in
this action by the thought that someone will buy them out rather than have the whole plan
collapse.”); McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 454 (“Municipal bankruptcy law thus
originated from a desire to control minority holdouts, and arose in a context of substantial
uncertainty over the appropriate relationship between federal and state law. These issues still
resonate in the current Chapter 9.”).
262
See Vincent S.J. Buccola, An Ex Ante Approach to Excessive State Debt, 64 DUKE
L.J. 235, 272 (2014) (“Chapter 9 is thus oriented toward a singular function—the elimination
of debt overhang.”); see also Skeel, supra note 23, at 687 (“[B]ankruptcy may also be
necessary to solve a debt overhang problem.”).
263
See generally Christopher J. Tyson, Municipal Identity as Property, 118 PA. ST. L.
REV. 647, 695 (2014) (observing that state boundary laws may contribute to central city
financial instability and suggesting that boundary policies be reconsidered in the course of a
municipal bankruptcy).
264
As a starting point, this Article accepts the idea that federal bankruptcy is an option
that can and should be available for municipalities. The options described in this Part are
designed to realign Chapter 9 with federal bankruptcy principles and goals and are not meant
to be wholesale replacements for the federal bankruptcy process.
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areas of focus for reform: a holistic re-design of Chapter 9 so that it is no longer an
offshoot of Chapter 11; reconsideration of the balance between federal relief and
state sovereignty; and new roles for taxpayers, the region, and the state. Section B
provides guidance on the timing and use of these reforms, cautioning that even with
the advocated reforms, municipal relief should be tailored whenever possible to
account for the broad scope of problems different municipal entities could face.
A. Overhaul and Reform
Reforming Chapter 9 outright poses many challenges. Many of the reforms that
would give Chapter 9 more clout as a bankruptcy mechanism, such as allowing the
judge to play a greater role in the case, appointing a trustee to manage the case, or
giving debtors the ability to renegotiate more types of debt, would run afoul of state
sovereignty concerns.265 Although granting the bankruptcy court more power to, for
example, sell property or raise taxes, would certainly provide more opportunity for
creditor involvement in the bankruptcy case, any move toward increasing federal
power in municipal bankruptcy is likely to meet with great resistance due to the
concerns discussed above over federal intrusion into state sovereignty.266 Proposals
to allow bankruptcy to give municipalities a true fresh start by allowing for
reincorporation or the drawing of new boundary lines, for example, raise similar
concerns.
It is also difficult to reform Chapter 9 because municipalities must continue to
provide essential services to their constituents even while they are in bankruptcy.
This requirement means that many typical bankruptcy benefits, such as the breathing
space provided by the automatic stay,267 will likely remain diminished regardless of
how Chapter 9 is changed. Furthermore, given a municipality’s inevitable political
interactions, federal bankruptcy is likely to remain an incomplete remedy in the
municipal context, since bankruptcy is ill-equipped to address political problems.
Nevertheless, these difficulties should not prevent reforms where reform is
possible to increase predictability and consistency with bankruptcy law. There are
three primary areas of focus for future reform: (1) providing Chapter 9 its own
toolkit; (2) redefining the balance between state sovereignty and federal bankruptcy
law; and (3) establishing new roles for the key players in a municipal bankruptcy.
Each of these areas is described in greater detail below.

265

See supra section II.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s views in the Ashton and
Bekins cases regarding potential Tenth Amendment problems with giving other parties power
to interfere with the states).
266
See Freyberg, supra note 17, at 1023 (reviewing various proposals designed to
increase the power of the bankruptcy court and suggesting that such proposals would likely
be “‘dead on arrival’ at Congress”).
267
See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
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1. Redesign
The first area of focus should be redesigning Chapter 9 as its own independent
form of bankruptcy relief. Bankruptcy law serves valuable purposes, but Chapter 9
needs its own set of rules to achieve those purposes. As described above, the entities
Chapter 9 is designed to help look very different from the entities for which Chapter
11 was created. Nevertheless, Chapter 9 is based primarily off of Chapter 11. It
makes little sense for Chapter 11 to serve as the baseline for Chapter 9.268 Although
a complete overhaul of Chapter 9 will require extensive study, this Article’s
examination of how Chapter 11 principles have failed to work in Chapter 9 suggests
clear areas of focus for concrete modification of Chapter 9. The following broad
proposals are meant to provide guidance and starting points to consider for reform.
In redesigning Chapter 9, specific focus should be placed on developing rules
that clarify current areas of confusion. This is particularly true with respect to plan
confirmation rules, such as those concerning feasibility and cramdown. Judges
should not have to rely on their “conscience,” as the judge in Detroit’s bankruptcy
did,269 to articulate what makes a plan of adjustment feasible and fair in the Chapter
9 context, nor should they have to rely on standards from Chapter 11 that are
confusing when applied to Chapter 9. A new focus on development of Chapter 9specific standards should make judges more comfortable cramming down a plan
over the objections of creditors. Establishment of Chapter 9-specific rules should
also provide more clarity about the priority of claims in Chapter 9 and whether and
how municipal contracts can be modified.
A consequence of strengthening municipalities’ relief under Chapter 9 is the
effect on borrowing costs for municipalities. If municipal debtors can more easily
cram down a plan over objections, for example, concerned creditors may increase
the cost of borrowing for municipalities. Although further study into whether and
how proposed changes to Chapter 9 affect borrowing costs is certainly warranted,
under the current situation, municipalities that have gone through Chapter 9
bankruptcy face the prospect of both ineffective relief and higher borrowing costs.
If the bankruptcy process can be used to put a municipality on firmer footing,
increasing the municipality’s long-term stability and control over its debts, perhaps
future borrowing costs will not be as high.
Any redesign of Chapter 9 should also consider utilizing separate rules and
procedures for special-purpose municipal entities. These entities, which include
school, hospital, water, and sewer districts, look very different in form and structure
from general-purpose municipalities, such as the cities, towns, and counties that
268
Indeed, some scholars have even noted that municipal bankruptcy is more akin to
individual bankruptcy than business bankruptcy. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 14, at 292
(“The effect is that municipal bankruptcy serves as a mechanism by which localities can
obtain the equivalent of the fresh start available to individuals in bankruptcy, rather than the
‘efficient reconfiguration of assets’ characteristic of corporate bankruptcy.”).
269
Rochelle & Toub, supra note 241, at 1600.
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have served as this Article’s focus. To the extent possible, Chapter 9 relief should
be tailored so that each municipal entity utilizes procedures that take into account
the structure, purpose, and creditors of each individual entity type. Of course,
additional tailoring increases the information costs associated with operating under
the rules, but when entities are so vastly different, it is worth considering whether
Chapter 9 might simply be broken down into broad categories, with different rules
applying for general-purpose and special-purpose entities.270
A potential consequence of a holistic redesign of Chapter 9 is that the “new”
Chapter 9 may be more difficult for bankruptcy judges to administer. Currently,
Chapter 9’s similarity to Chapter 11 may appeal to bankruptcy judges, many of
whom only rarely encounter municipal bankruptcies. It will take time for bankruptcy
judges to learn about, use, and develop law in the “new” Chapter 9, possibly
increasing unpredictability and instability in the law in the short term. Still, these
difficulties are not insurmountable. The Bankruptcy Code as a whole is constantly
undergoing scrutiny and reform. In fact, a recent proposal would substantially
change the Chapter 11 process.271 The possibility that any proposed changes will
slow the law’s development in the short term should be balanced against the need to
have a system that can meet the goals it is designed to accomplish.
2. A Better Balance
A second area of focus should be on redefining the precarious and uncertain
balance between state sovereignty and federal bankruptcy law that currently shapes
Chapter 9. One way to do this is to focus on eligibility battles. Under the current
system, a municipality must jump through two primary hurdles to receive access to
Chapter 9 relief: it must receive state authorization to file for bankruptcy, and it must
then meet all of the federal bankruptcy requirements for eligibility.272 As
demonstrated, this process creates costly litigation battles that municipalities must
fight before they can access bankruptcy relief. One possibility for streamlining a

270

A similar proposal has been made in the Chapter 11 context, to better account for
the differences between larger and smaller entities. See AKIN GUMP, AMERICAN
BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (ABI) REFORM COMMISSION RELEASES REPORT RECOMMENDING
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO CHAPTER 11, at 4 (2014), https://www.akingump.com/images/
content/3/4/v2/34347/American-Bankruptcy-Institute-ABI-Reform-Commission-ReleasesR.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVA5-C2XK] (describing the “creation of a new chapter 11
paradigm for small and middle-sized enterprises (SMEs)”).
271
See generally AM. BANKR. INST., COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER
11: 2012–2014 FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2014) (on file with the Utah Law
Review), https://abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h (explaining proposals to
change Chapter 11).
272
See supra subsection II.B.1.
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municipality’s path to relief could involve putting the eligibility process entirely in
state hands.273
Making the state the exclusive gatekeeper for Chapter 9 would still allow the
state to “opt in” to federal bankruptcy relief for its municipalities. At the same time,
eliminating the federal eligibility hurdles would make Chapter 9 more consistent
with the goal of open access to bankruptcy court, while still respecting principles of
state sovereignty.
Eliminating federal eligibility requirements could also substantially reduce the
overall cost to municipalities of the Chapter 9 proceeding. As seen above, federal
eligibility battles usually take several months and eat up a large fraction of a
municipality’s bankruptcy budget. Eliminating the federal eligibility requirements
would mean that, while in bankruptcy, eligible debtors can more quickly focus their
attention on developing a plan of adjustment and, ultimately, on getting back to
work. In short, removing the federal eligibility hurdle could streamline the eligibility
process without jeopardizing state sovereignty interests.
A side effect of eliminating the federal eligibility requirements is the further
diminishment of the role of creditors in a Chapter 9 case. As previously discussed,
eligibility hearings represent one of the few opportunities for creditors to get
involved in a municipal bankruptcy.274 Taking this opportunity away from creditors
may make them more likely to hold out at the confirmation stage; however, the
development of more powerful cramdown rules in the Chapter 9 context, as
suggested above, may help alleviate this problem.
Making the state the sole eligibility gatekeeper may also increase the role that
state politics plays in municipal bankruptcy. A potential resolution to this issue is
for states to create a special entity or agency to serve as a gatekeeper for state
authorization. This agency could be composed of appointed bankruptcy experts
within the state, rather than politicians. The presence of a more neutral entity could
reduce the role of politics in eligibility proceedings, as discussed more fully below.
Regardless of whether eligibility remains in federal hands or shifts entirely to
the state, it is critical to recognize that Chapter 9 is only a partial solution to the
problem of municipal fiscal distress. More research is needed to determine what
exactly Chapter 9 does best in order to subsequently determine which entities—state,
federal, or both—should play the role of Chapter 9 “gatekeeper.”
3. New Roles
The third and final area of focus for reform should be on reexamining the roles
of the various parties affected by a municipal bankruptcy. The range of focus
includes (a) taxpayers, (b) state government, and (c) regional bodies.

273

This idea could be accomplished via statutory modification to Chapter 9. For
example, the federal eligibility requirements could be reduced to one requirement, which
makes municipalities eligible if their state specifically authorizes them to be.
274
See supra notes 96–98.
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(a) Taxpayers
Giving taxpayers a role to play in a Chapter 9 case as parties in interest would
better align Chapter 9 with the due process ideal to allow parties affected by a case
the ability to participate in that case.275 Allowing taxpayers in particular to intervene
in a bankruptcy would also provide a counterpoint to those creditors whose primary
interests lie not in keeping the municipality afloat but in getting paid at any cost.276
By enabling a multitude of voices and perspectives to be heard, Chapter 9 may serve
as a more effective tool for the municipality to raise arguments that may not
otherwise be addressed in bankruptcy.
The judge in Detroit recognized the importance of giving taxpayers a voice in
municipal bankruptcy when he held a hearing to listen to nearly fifty Detroit
residents who objected to Detroit’s bankruptcy filing.277 Although allowing taxpayer
interests to dominate a case at the expense of creditors and the debtor may be
counterproductive, giving taxpayers a formal avenue to participate in the case may
allow key issues to come to light and is consistent with the goals of bankruptcy law
and due process more generally.278
The question of how much of a role to give taxpayers in the municipal
bankruptcy process is worth further study.279 Giving taxpayers a direct vote on a
municipality’s plan of adjustment may stall the process unnecessarily or make the
case unmanageable. For example, taxpayers, particularly in places where the
political climate disfavors taxation, could vote down plans that call for even modest
tax increases. On the other hand, making taxpayers a class that can vote on a plan
may be less of a concern if the bankruptcy judge can effectively enforce the debtor’s
power to cram down an otherwise fair and feasible plan.
Of course, taxpayers are arguably already represented in a bankruptcy case
through the municipal officials that they have elected to represent their interests.
Still, when a community is in the midst of a bankruptcy that can drastically affect
275

See Coordes, supra note 205, at 408.
Similarly, the interests of taxpayers are often not aligned with the interests of
officials. See Moberg & Wagner, supra note 55, at 33 (“In a municipal corporation, . . . the
officials deciding how to spend the money are not guided by the incentive to maximize the
value of their investments on behalf of their residents.”).
277
Nathan Bromey & Matt Helms, Citizen Objectors to Detroit Bankruptcy Get Day in
Court, USATODAY (Sept. 19, 2013, 6:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2013/09/19/detroit-bankruptcy-citizens-hearing/2839913/ [https://perma.cc/3FCH-KT35].
278
See Coordes, supra note 205, at 387–88 (making a similar argument for greater
stakeholder participation in large Chapter 11 cases).
279
At least one scholar has already begun to formulate theories about the propriety and
degree of taxpayer involvement in a Chapter 9 case. See generally C. Scott Pryor, Who Bears
the Burden? The Place for Participation of Municipal Residents in Chapter 9, 37 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 161 (2015) (providing that a committee should represent residents for the purposes
of Chapter 9 plans); C. Scott Pryor, Who Pays the Price? The Necessity of Taxpayer
Participation in Chapter 9, 24 WIDENER L.J. 81 (2015) (explaining how bankruptcy courts
can address procedural and structural barriers to resident participation in Chapter 9 plans).
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the living conditions of its residents, giving taxpayers the opportunity to explain for
themselves how the bankruptcy will affect them will enhance the ability of
representatives to address constituent concerns. Furthermore, giving taxpayers a
voice may prevent some taxpayers from “voting with their feet” and simply leaving
the municipality altogether. Thus, while the level of taxpayer participation in a
municipal bankruptcy case need not rise to the point of giving them a direct vote on
the plan, providing a formal avenue for taxpayers to communicate directly with the
bankruptcy judge and officials involved in the bankruptcy would have significant
benefits.
(b) States
States may also have a greater role to play in a Chapter 9 case; however, that
role must be carefully considered. Scholars have argued that Chapter 9 is designed
to work in conjunction with the state,280 and that state involvement is necessary for
a municipality in distress.281 The importance of state involvement in Chapter 9 is
further emphasized by the fact that in some cases, the holdout creditors in a Chapter
9 case are not private creditors, but other governmental entities.282 For example,
CalPERS, a state agency, has been a key holdout creditor in many California
municipal bankruptcies. These governmental entities, far from helping bankrupt
municipalities, exacerbate the bankruptcy process in their role as holdout creditors.
State involvement in municipal fiscal distress might therefore involve increased
awareness of the roles state agencies play in a Chapter 9 case and coordination so
that these agencies help the municipalities they are intended to work with.
State intervention into a municipality’s affairs has sometimes worked well. For
example, scholars support an ex ante approach to state involvement, beginning with
the time when the municipality is issuing debt.283 Some states, such as New York,
have begun to move in this direction, requiring municipalities to report financial data
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Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 403, 415–16 (2014).
281
Id. at 415 (“The real governance vacuum in Chapter 9 emerges when the state fails
to provide any direction for the financial rehabilitation of its cities.”); see also PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 212, at 4–6 (providing guidance to states about whether and
how “to assist municipalities facing fiscal stress”); Kimhi, supra note 59, at 637 (arguing that
“state intervention is the most effective remedy for local financial crises”); Jones, supra note
109 (“States have an obligation to monitor what they have created.”).
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See Frank Shafroth, Municipal Bankruptcy & the Role of Intergovernmental
Relations,
GMU
MUN.
SUSTAINABILITY
PROJECT
(Aug.
18,
2015),
https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/municipal-bankruptcy-the-role-ofintergovernmental-relations/ [https://perma.cc/UFS7-PY2B] (noting that California’s
“actions in recent years . . . have only served to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate San
Bernardino’s fiscal problems”).
283
See Lessard & Ngo, supra note 140, at 399; see also Buccola, supra note 18, at 240
(arguing in favor of an ex ante approach to state financial distress).
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to the state comptroller on a regular basis.284 Elsewhere, North Carolina is
considered a shining example of ex ante state involvement.285 North Carolina’s
Local Government Commission reviews budgets and debt proposals from all of the
state’s municipalities on a regular basis.286 When a review signals that a locality may
be facing fiscal trouble, the state puts the locality on a watch list and imposes strict
guidelines for funding deals.287
Within Chapter 9 itself, state intervention has sometimes worked as well. The
bankruptcy case of Central Falls, Rhode Island is often cited as an example of
successful state involvement in municipal affairs.288 After the city of Central Falls
asked to be put into receivership under state law, lawmakers quickly passed two
different laws that preserved Central Falls’ ability to continue borrowing funds.289
In contrast to many of the cities and towns profiled above, Central Falls emerged
from bankruptcy in just over a year.290 The state’s prompt intervention is widely
credited with Central Falls’ success.
Yet, there is no guarantee that what has worked in Rhode Island or North
Carolina will work in other states. Due to variances in political climates and voter
attitudes, states may be hampered in their efforts to intervene, or they may not be
able—or willing—to intervene at all. Although scholars and policymakers have
touted North Carolina’s ex ante system for years, it is telling that other states have
not adopted a similar system. In fact, some states have even moved in the opposite
direction—the state of California, for example, has repeatedly demonstrated that it
is not willing to provide oversight to most municipalities, either before or after the
entity succumbs to distress.291 In 1995, the governor of California vetoed a bill that
would have created a Local Area Bankruptcy Committee that would perform a
monitoring role for municipalities and eventually decide on bankruptcy
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authorization.292 The governor was concerned that the bill would inappropriately
allow a state government instrument to “usurp” local authority.293 In other states,
constituents may resist state involvement, believing that it is not the state’s
responsibility to interfere in the municipality’s affairs.294
Even in states where increasing state intervention is feasible, proactive state
intervention may cause more harm than good if the state interferes without taking
the necessary time to develop an understanding of the municipality and the root
causes of its problems. This requires an investment of time and effort at the state
level just to create intervention programs and guidelines. State actors may also fail
to act independently or may be subject to some of the same political influences as
municipal officials. State intervention may even have an adverse effect on incentives
at the municipal level. For example, municipal decision makers who believe that
they can rely on a state bailout or other state assistance may lack the incentives to
proactively pursue restructuring alternatives or financial reform.295
State intervention also comes at a cost. As states themselves face budgetary
struggles, they may be disinclined to intervene in the affairs of their municipalities.
Indeed, state budget problems may even contribute to the cause of municipal fiscal
distress, as states struggling to meet their own budgets refuse to continue to fund or
provide services to their cities and towns. Even if states do not provide direct
monetary assistance to distressed municipalities, other forms of help, such as
increased state-level monitoring, may divert resources and personnel away from
addressing state-level responsibilities. Thus, although state intervention may
certainly be beneficial, it is not clear that the state will be able to overcome
countervailing reasons not to intervene.
State intervention methods may themselves fail or be too little, too late.
Although early state intervention has arguably served to prevent municipal
bankruptcies in some states,296 intervention efforts have not always worked well. For
example, despite the existence of strong state oversight,297 many New Jersey
municipalities are facing a looming pension crisis and other fiscal difficulties that
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Frederick Tung, After Orange County: Reforming California Municipal Bankruptcy
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may lead them to bankruptcy’s door.298 Additionally, although the state of Michigan
regularly reviews local governments for signs of distress, it does not intervene until
events indicating financial distress have already been triggered.299 This timing
problem is exacerbated because the state is composed of diverse actors who can
disagree about the appropriate level of involvement in municipal affairs, slowing
down needed relief. For example, in New Jersey, State Senate President Stephen
Sweeney recently criticized Governor Chris Christie for appointing an emergency
manager for Atlantic City, pledging a “big fight” against any potential bankruptcy
for the city.300
In short, state intervention, though valuable, may also do more harm than good
in certain circumstances.301 Nevertheless, given that local fiscal decisions often
resonate on the state level, it is important for states to at least be aware of, if not
involved in, local fiscal crises to the extent possible.302 Reforming Chapter 9 to
provide for an explicit role for state involvement in municipal bankruptcy, however,
may not be feasible given the existing variance in state involvement. At the federal
level, standardizing a way to give states control over a municipality’s eligibility for
bankruptcy may be the only feasible form of federally mandated state intervention.
(c) A Middle Ground: Regional Coordination
Regional coordination mechanisms, either in conjunction with or in lieu of state
intervention, may also have a role to play in a new Chapter 9. As seen in Detroit’s
battle with its suburbs over the assets in the Detroit Institute of Arts museum,
municipal fiscal issues may affect an entire region.303 Creating a regional fiscal
298
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monitoring mechanism that could address fiscal inequalities and ensure that the
municipalities in the region are acting in a fiscally responsible manner could serve
to fill the gap if the state is unable or unwilling to intervene, or if voter attitudes
disfavor state involvement.304 Of course, regional entities may still be subject to
political pressures, which could lessen their effectiveness as problem solvers.
Still, regional coordination in some form may be valuable because municipal
bankruptcy is in fact regional—its effects frequently extend beyond the boundaries
of the struggling entity. Regional solutions do not necessarily have to involve every
nearby city or town. Instead, a broad swath of regional coordination opportunities
should be considered, including public/private partnerships or even coalitions
among neighboring states.305 These types of coalitions are consistent with the idea
of bankruptcy as a collective process and may help decrease transaction costs and
quickly effectuate relief. Sharing services with nearby jurisdictions should be
considered, as collaborating with more affluent communities could in turn
strengthen a municipal debtor’s fiscal health.
An example of regional involvement having these positive effects is the city of
Detroit’s creation of a regional water authority during its bankruptcy. A six-person
board runs the new water authority, with appointments from the city, surrounding
counties, and the state governor.306 The regional deal is being touted both for
smoothing over relations between Detroit and its suburbs and for its ability to
generate more revenue, as a bond sale from the authority would likely fetch higher
rates than a bond sale from the city by itself.307 In short, although regional
intervention in the municipal financial distress context is a relatively untested
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concept, Detroit’s use of regional mechanisms illustrates the potential for regional
solutions to become a very powerful tool in federal bankruptcy.308
B. Timing and Use
In thinking about how to design and implement changes to Chapter 9, reformers
must pay attention to the variances among the fiscal and political climates of states
and their municipalities. Currently, Chapter 9 represents a one-size-fits-all solution
to innumerable forms of crisis for a variety of municipal entities of all shapes and
sizes. Chapter 9’s failure to account for these variations is a key shortcoming that
must be remedied if it is to function as a viable form of relief. For example, any
response to a municipal fiscal crisis must take into account the effects of state
policies already in place that may constrain the municipality.309
One way to incorporate flexibility into a new version of Chapter 9 is to consider
timing. It is critical to determine when municipalities would be better off using state
alternatives to bankruptcy instead of Chapter 9. Several states, such as Pennsylvania,
have receivership programs designed to be utilized either before or in lieu of Chapter
9.310 These state programs can provide more oversight mechanisms for
municipalities but do not allow the municipalities to modify contracts on a
nonconsensual basis.311 Because of these programs, municipalities may avoid filing
for bankruptcy entirely, or they may delay filing, sometimes to their detriment.312
Developing “triggers” for when a municipality should seek federal relief, as some
states have already done for their state insolvency programs, could help
municipalities access federal relief at a time when that relief is most likely to help
them.
Currently, some states, such as Louisiana and Michigan, erect so many hurdles
to filing for Chapter 9 that it becomes impossible for the municipality to file for
308
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bankruptcy until it is well beyond most traditional forms of help, while other states
have no barriers to filing at all.313 In the latter states, municipalities that file for
Chapter 9 run the risk that their filing will be thrown out by the court as premature.
In both cases, debtors expend substantial upfront costs before their Chapter 9 cases
see the light of day. Thus, part of the solution for reforming Chapter 9 may well lie
in fixing the timing—recognizing when bankruptcy will best help the municipality
and when other solutions will be more beneficial. Simply advocating for increased
intervention at any level is useless if that intervention is too ill-timed to be of value.
To help municipalities and states strike the right balance in terms of timing,
states that erect barriers to filing for Chapter 9 could do more to ensure that those
barriers take the form of bankruptcy experts rather than politicians. For example,
one commentator has already suggested changing Louisiana’s approval process so
that it is run by a neutral fiscal administrator rather than by the state’s elected Bond
Commission.314 Other states with barriers to entry to Chapter 9 should consider
modifying their approval processes so that more neutral bankruptcy experts are
involved in the decision-making process at an earlier stage. By providing a more
inclusive role for bankruptcy or municipal finance experts, states could alleviate the
concern that the road to municipal bankruptcy is more a political than a fiscal
process. For example, politicians may hesitate for too long to file for bankruptcy out
of concern that they will face the blame for the city’s financial condition.
Alternatively, politicians may jump into bankruptcy too soon, seeing it as the
solution to all of their problems or, at the least, as a scapegoat for the criticisms
leveled at them by their constituents. Importantly, these experts need not replace
politicians, but giving experts an increased advisory role may help municipal
officials better determine when seeking federal relief is appropriate.
Even if increasing the role of expert advisors is not feasible, experts may be
able to play a monitoring role. Increased monitoring at either the pre- or postbankruptcy level (or, preferably, at both points in time) may also help to alleviate
many of the problems that currently characterize Chapter 9. Monitoring by a neutral
bankruptcy expert may help reduce some of the politics and interest group pressures
that can come into play, making it easier for the municipality to regain its footing
post-bankruptcy. Increased monitoring can also help to shore up a municipality’s
financial position, and post-bankruptcy monitoring in particular may even make the
bankruptcy process cost justified for the municipality, as it continues to receive
assistance in the form of advice and oversight after it emerges from Chapter 9.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no easy solution to combat the problems of municipal financial
distress. If federal bankruptcy is to remain an option for doing so, however, it is in
need of reform. Over twenty years ago, a call went out to reform the municipal
313
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bankruptcy system—a call that, by and large, has been ignored.315 By analyzing a
series of recent Chapter 9 filings, this Article has provided concrete evidence of the
need for reform and has identified primary concerns to address in thinking about the
next phase of municipal bankruptcy. Studying the cities and towns that are going
through or have emerged from Chapter 9 provides important insights and critical
examples of Chapter 9’s shortcomings. A close examination of these cities’ journeys
through bankruptcy illustrates how and why Chapter 9, in its current incarnation,
fails to function as an ideal bankruptcy relief mechanism.
By studying the difficulties municipalities have encountered in utilizing
Chapter 9, policymakers can make more informed decisions about the future of
bankruptcy law more generally. By identifying Chapter 9’s functional shortcomings,
this Article should help policymakers think through whether and how bankruptcy
law should be applied to new areas. For example, the work assimilated in this Article
should be useful in evaluating recent proposals to utilize bankruptcy to address the
difficulties encountered by states,316 territories,317 and large financial institutions.318
This Article lays the groundwork for future examination into comprehensive
reform of Chapter 9 bankruptcy. Studying what has gone wrong with municipal
bankruptcies over the years allows for a more accurate evaluation of proposed
solutions to combating the problem of municipal financial distress. This Article’s
examination of how Chapter 9 has fallen short of helping cities out of their distress
clearly indicates that it is time to formulate more appropriate mechanisms to bolster
Chapter 9 relief for struggling cities and towns.
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